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1.  Introduction 
  This paper links accounting valuation of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to time-series 
variation in the companion concepts of cash flow persistence and depreciation bias.  By doing this, we 
add to a prior literature that documents how accounting valuations have changed over time.  Using large 
samples, this research has found that variation in valuation weights can be related to firm fundamentals 
such as earnings persistence, growth, and (or) discount rates (e.g., Collins and Kothari [1989], Johnson 
[1999], or Kothari and Shanken [2003]).  Yet,  the possibility that instability in valuation weights is 
caused not just by variation in fundamentals, but also by variation in accounting quality, by sector or over 
time is relatively unexplored in this prior research (e.g., Collins, Maydew and Weiss [1997], Francis and 
Schipper [1999], Lev and Zarowin [1999], Jenkins, Kane, and Velury [2009]).1  Despite the interest in 
understanding how accounting quality has impacted valuations over time, identifying research strategies 
that can disentangle the valuation effects of fundamentals (such as cash flows and discount rates) from the 
informativeness of accounting accruals is a challenge. 
 This paper uses the Feltham and Ohlson [1996] (FO96) model to identify these effects for firms, 
particularly REITs, with large depreciation charges.  The FO96 framework identifies parameters 
associated with the valuation effects due to growth in cash flows and investing, and due to depreciation 
bias.  We apply this framework to REITs and fixed-asset intensive non-REIT firms. The model is a price- 
levels regression that allows for different weights on depreciation expense versus the weight on non-
depreciation component of income and allows these weights to vary over time.2  Depreciation bias in this 
framework can be detected if the valuation weight on depreciation is different from the valuation weight 
on other income components. We demonstrate that time series variation in valuation weights is expected 
                                                 1 For example, in their study of changing valuation weights over time, Collins et al. [1997] comment: “The analysis in this paper raises a number of questions for future research. First, it is not clear whether the changes in value-relevance we document are due to changes in GAAP or due to 'real' economic changes. Second, the effects of variation in the value-relevance of earnings and book values across industries and changes in industry composition across time have not been fully explored.” 2 While FO96 doesn't explicitly include depreciation expense as a separate variable in their valuation model, they include a linear transfromation of depreciation expense, lagged property plant and equipment, that can capture the effect of a differential coefficent on depreciation relatvie to the coefficient on other components of net income. 
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if cash-flow persistence increases during booms and decreases during bust periods.  If so, and if 
depreciation is unresponsive to booms and busts (consistent with REITs depreciating buildings on a 
straight-line basis over 40 years), then the valuation weight on depreciation expense is counter-cyclical 
(i.e., it is greater during bust periods and less during booms).  The model demonstrates that net income 
receives a greater valuation weight during booms than during busts and the correction for depreciation 
bias will be larger during boom times. Consistent with these underlying assumptions, our empirical 
application of FO96 model to REITs suggests that cash flow valuation is pro-cyclical while depreciation 
valuation is counter-cyclical.  This is a result that is new to our paper. 
To cross-validate and to expand on this result, we explore whether this cyclicality also holds for a 
comparable sample of fixed-asset-intensive non-REITs.  We borrow this strategy from Kang and Zhao 
[2010].  To the extent that the underlying assumptions of the FO96 model are true for both REITs and 
non-REITs, we expect to find similar depreciation bias levels and cyclicality.  However, counter to this 
expectation, we find depreciation bias is lower for non-REITs than it is for REITs, and that valuation 
weights do not display cyclicality.   These results are similar to those of Kang and Zhao who present 
evidence suggesting that depreciation is unbiased for fixed-asset intensive non-REITS.   This prior paper 
attributes the differences between the REIT and non-REIT sample to the fact that REIT assets are held for 
sale in a liquid market, whereas the assets of non-REIT’s are held for use and may be difficult to sell 
(page 232).  We add to Kang and Zhao by expanding on this explanation.  We contend that the lower 
depreciation bias in the non-REIT sample is likely attributable to differences in depreciation methods 
within the sample of non-REIT firms. In particular, some sectors within the non-REIT sample use asset 
allocation methods that are linked to asset usage and the resultant decline in the asset's future ability to 
generate cash.  For example in the extractive sector, asset use is matched to revenues using depletion, 
while in the REIT sector, asset use is matched to revenues using straight-line depreciation. In general 
straight linedepreciation is insensitive to year to year changes in the assets future earnings potential that 
deviate from the long-term expect decline in the asset's resale value over its useful life. .  Depreciation 
biases are higher on average in the REIT sector than they are in the extractive sector, this is potentially 
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due to the extractive sector’s more direct link between resource consumption and depreciation expense. 
  The paper begins with a review of the  FO96 framework, where accounting bias is defined as a 
perpetual difference between market and book values.  This theoretical framework pinpoints the meaning 
of the sign and magnitude of the estimated valuation coefficients on depreciation and non-depreciation 
components of net income.   
In preliminary analysis, we estimate alternative valuation relations using both net income and 
funds from operation (FFO)--the premier valuation metric in the REIT industry. The definition of FFO is 
subject to quasi-regulation by the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts or NAREIT, the 
trade association for REITs.  FFO intends to circumvent depreciation bias; it is measured roughly as 
earnings before depreciation expense and before gains and losses on the sale of property. The FO96 
framework shows how these two measures of performance can explain stock prices equally well.  
Consistent with prior research, we find the explanatory power of the net income and FFO models are 
indistinguishable in the pre-2000 sub-period, but that the FFO valuation model dominates the net income 
model after 2000. Strictly speaking, this latter result is a puzzle, and it could be interpreted as a rejection 
of FO96 because, as mentioned already, when correctly specified, the two valuation approaches should be 
equivalent. 
   Of course, these preliminary tests assume stationarity of model parameters, and a rejection of the stationary model could alternatively be due to the applicability of this assumption. To address our main research question regarding macro-induced cyclicality in valuation arising from depreciation bias, we relax the stationarity assumption.  We show that time series variation in valuation coefficients can occur if the persistence of cash flows is impacted by supply and demand shocks to real estate.  We apply this time-varying coefficient model to data for 157 REITs, and, in supplemental tests that follow Kang and Zhao [2010], we also estimate the model for a matched 
sample of non-REIT firms.   The empirical tests of the non-stationary FO96 framework lead to the aforementioned conclusions regarding the relative depreciation bias in REITs and in non-REITs. 
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This paper contributes to the literature in accounting along two main dimensions. First, we 
provide new insights to prior research on the valuation of REIT firms.  These studies often attempt to 
understand the valuation characteristics of FFO versus net income.  For example, Baik et al. [2008] 
propose that the different conclusions regarding the usefulness of net income versus FFO in the post-2000 
period can be traced to new regulation from NAREIT that sharpened the measurement and disclosure of 
FFO.  (Appendix A shows the evolution of NAREIT-defined FFO during our sample period.)  
Nevertheless, increased valuation cyclicality in the REIT setting in the post 2000 period coincides with 
this regulatory change and creates the potential for spurious conclusions.  Our time-varying adaptation of 
FO96 in combination with our use of data from both decades allows us to formally test, whether 
differences in findings between the pre- and post-2000 periods are partially or wholly due to cyclicality in 
depreciation bias. Our tests comparing the pre- and post-2000 periods show both a discrete shift in the 
valuation weight applied to FFO (consistent with the prior evidence in Baik et al.) and cyclicality in cash 
flow and depreciation valuation weights. 
 In focusing on the role of depreciation bias, our conclusions also reflect back to the work of Gore 
and Stott [1998] (who use data from 1991-1996) and Kang and Zhao [2010] (who use data from 2000-
2005). Yearly regressions using annual returns in Gore and Stott [1998] show varying signs and 
significance on depreciation expense (Table 5); this prior paper concludes the average value relevance of 
depreciation is zero. Kang and Zhao reach the opposite conclusion using a price levels regression.    
Because accounting depreciation bias in REITs varies with macro-economic conditions, we believe that 
focusing on a narrow time period, as prior papers have typically done, can lead to results that do not 
generalize. 
Our papermakes a second contribution, contributing to the more general literature that examines 
the reasons that valuation parameters change with macro-economic factors.  Our application of the 
adapted FO96 model (i.e., with time-varying coefficients) to REITS and non-REITs allows for well-
reasoned interpretations of the changing valuation weights on specific earnings components.  In particular 
we identify the role of fundamental drivers of value, meaning cash flows, versus, the quality of 
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depreciation expense.   Prior studies such as Bernard and Stober (1989), or Johnson (1999) use relatively 
large and heterogeneous samples to investigate the impact of business cycles on the information content 
of earnings or earnings components for stock returns.  Others such as Francis and Shipper [1999], Collins, 
Maydew and Weiss [1997] or Core, Guay and Buskirk [2003] (along with the commentary by Kothari 
and Shanken [2003]) examine time-variation in valuation weights in a price levels regression.   Similar to 
us, Kothari and Shanken’s study directly links valuation weights in a price-levels formulation to macro 
variables as a means to shed light on the importance of time-varying accounting quality in value relevance 
studies.3   However, like other prior studies, Kothari and Shanken  do not separate accounting quality 
from real economic sources of variation in valuation. Our paper emphasizes the analytical benefits of 
considering sector-specific operating and accounting characteristics to develop models and tests that can 
discern among the differing and time-varying components of valuation.  Primarily, the insights are 
sharpest for REITs, but, we use these insights to comment on valuation cyclicality in other sectors.    
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information 
on the REIT sector, including a brief review of real estate cycle theories. Section 3 presents the theoretical 
valuation model and hypotheses. Section 4 outlines key research design choices and explains our sample 
selection. Section 5 provides tests of our hypotheses, and Section 6 concludes the study. 
2. The REIT setting and the REIT Valuation Literature 
2.1       Background on Valuation Research for REITS 
REITs are publicly-traded, flow-through entities which avoid corporate taxation by passing 
earnings to shareholders through dividends.  To qualify for this tax shield, a REIT must invest most of its 
                                                 3 Also pertinent to our paper is Jenkins, Kane and Velury [2009].   Jenkins et al. relate business cycles to “conditional” conservatism using a reverse regression of earnings on returns as done by Basu [1997].    Using a large and sector-diverse sample, they document more conditionally-conservative reporting (meaning, a larger weight translating bad news to earnings) in contractions, and weaker value relevance of earnings for returns in expansions.   For REITs, using a price-levels approach, the FO96 model shows more unconditional conservatism during booms (e.g., because depreciation is more understated during booms) and, less conservative accounting in busts.  Hence, the prediction for unconditional conservatism is opposite to that proposed in Jenkins et al. [2009] for conditional conservatism. However, we would expect prices to be more positively related to net income during busts and less so during booms, consistent with the predictions in Jenkins et al., who use a different research method and focus on a different aspect of conservatism.   
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assets in real estate and earn the majority of its income from rentals (Matheson 2008). Because of the 
large holdings of developed property, REIT’s depreciation expense is a dominate accrual.  Hence, the 
setting is a good one for examining the valuation properties of depreciation expense.  
REIT managers have argued that depreciation expense frequently exceeds the real depreciation of 
their developed property, thereby making net income understate firm performance. To overcome this 
shortcoming to net income, NAREIT (1991) developed a non-GAAP performance measure, FFO, which 
is based on net income measured before depreciation expense and before gains and losses on real 
property.4 Since its introduction, most REITs have reported FFO in addition to net income in their annual 
reports. NAREIT member companies claim that FFO reflects firm performance more accurately than net 
income (NAREIT 1996), and analysts and the financial media have largely accepted FFO as a standard 
industry earnings measure, despite early criticisms from some analysts (e.g., Martinez [1998] and Smith 
[2001].)  
The debates over the usefulness of FFO among market participants led to research examining 
how effective FFO and net income are in providing valuation relevant information for investors. These 
studies (e.g., Vincent 1998 or Fields et al. 1997) compare the two earnings measures based on their ability 
to explain levels of, or changes in, publicly traded equity values. However, the results of this research are 
mixed.  For the most part, studies that estimate models in the 1990’s are unable to differentiate the 
explanatory power of models that anchor on FFO versus net income.  Research that uses data after the 
year 2000 when NAREIT imposed more structure on the disclosure and measurement of FFO, tends to 
conclude that FFO is more relevant (Baik et al. [2008] and Kang and Zhao [2010]).  Note however the 
post-2000 research methods are not always comparable to the methods used on earlier sample periods. 
The evidence in prior studies that relies on three- to six-year sample periods does not capture the 
impact of longer-term real estate cycles on FFO and net income valuation weights. While the market 
value of real property fluctuates with booms and busts, the book value of land is held constant and the 
                                                 4 Gains or losses on the sale of real property are in part a reflection of past over- (or under-) depreciation of real property. Therefore, FFO removes from net income both depreciation expense and gains or losses on the sale of real property. 
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non-land component of real property is systematically reduced through depreciation expense over time. 
Intuitively, depreciation expense can measure the declining cash generating potential of real property as 
demand falls or the structure wears out, but it will fail to capture increases in asset values when demand is 
high.  This idea is not new and is the stated reason for developing FFO measures in the first place.  In 
fact, Fields et al. [1998] appeal to a real estate downturn in the early 1990’s to explain the negative 
coefficient they estimate on depreciation expense in their Table 3.5  We conjecture that valuation models 
in the REIT setting can be improved by allowing for continuous variation in parameters with macro-
measures of the supply and demand for real estate.  We test this conjecture by allowing the valuation 
coefficients on income components including on depreciation expense to vary with supply and demand 
shocks in the real estate sector. 
2.2  What causes real estate cycles? 
 Our empirical tests link measures of real estate supply and demand shocks to changing 
persistence of cash flows for REITs.  Given this, a brief review of the nature of real estate cycles seems 
warranted. The idea that real estate fundamentals exhibit cyclical behavior is well-accepted, but 
economists have puzzled over the reasons for this cyclicality. To get a sense of what is meant by 
cyclicality, the plot of total returns for commercial real estate in Figure 1 Panel A is instructive. It shows 
two distinct peaks and one trough in a process that appears to move relatively smoothly between these 
local maxima and minima.  This cyclicality can occur due to the responses of real estate participants (e.g., 
buyers, sellers and builders) to unobserved, cyclical shocks to underlying, macro-fundamentals such as 
unemployment or credit availability.  
Alternatively cyclicality possibly originates from institutional frictions that lead to delayed 
responses of real estate prices to single shocks. Wheaton [1999]) explores this idea using a stock-flow 
durable goods framework. In his model, a single stochastic shock leads to a deviation in construction 
starts and rental prices from equilibrium levels.  This misalignment lasts for more than one period due to 
                                                 5 This Table contains a regression of REIT market capitalizations on FFO, book value of equity, dividends and depreciation expense. 
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construction lags (i.e., it takes time to build new structures).   Another contributing factor to the 
misalignment is the use of long-term lease arrangements which prevent rental revenues from immediately 
responding to changes in demand.  Or, borrowing for construction projects requires collateral whose 
valuation depends on price estimates made before the new space is delivered.  These explanations suggest 
reasons that investment and debt financing decisions might depend on current rather than future prices.6     
3. Model Development and Hypotheses 
3.1  Overview of FO 96 
Although our primary focus is on time-variation in REIT valuation weights, the basic intuition for 
the interpretation of our model parameters derives from an off-the-shelf, stationary valuation model due 
to FO96.  We start by describing the features of this model and then introduce time-varying weights.  The 
FO96 model defines a permanent difference between market values and accounting book values as 
accounting bias.  Bias can arise from fundamentals (such as value created by investing which is reflected 
in market value, but not in book value) and from accounting policies—in our case, depreciation 
schedules.  
Not all accounting valuation models incorporate bias.  The Ohlson [1995] model assumes that 
market and book values are equal over time; this occurs if the underlying times-series process of residual 
income (net income minus a capital charge) is auto-regressive. When residual income is autoregressive, it 
is straightforward to show that  the market value of common equity (cum-dividend) is equal to the linear 
combination of two explanatory variables--net income and book value of equity.  
FO96 augment the Ohlson [1995] model by adding the book value of property, plant and 
equipment, and investing outflows to better capture “real-world” accounting practices that could create 
persistent differences between market and book values.   In FO96 valuation, the inclusion (beyond net 
income and book value of equity) of lagged book value of property plant and equipment allows for the 
                                                 6 Other sources of a lagged response to a supply or demand shift are offered by Rajan (1994), who links cycles in real estate to career concerns by bank managers; Herring and Wachter (1999) who propose myopia on the part of bank managers with respect to the likelihood of losses; and Pavlov and Wachter (2004) who tie real estate cycles to under-pricing of non-recourse real estate loans. 
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incorporation of depreciation bias in valuation. In addition, the FO96 valuation model incorporates book 
value bias due to unrecorded growth prospects (i.e., positive net present value investing)  by incorporating 
investing cash flows as an information variable.  These two modelled sources of bias are likely to be 
present in firms with large depreciation charges such as REITs.  
  With regard to depreciation bias, the FO96 model contains two key parameters to correct for this 
bias -- ωrr, which captures the persistence of cash flows and is a “fundamental” driver of firm market 
value, and δpe which captures the depreciation policy of a REIT.   In FO96 bias in depreciation occurs 
when ωrr  and δpe are different.  When these parameters differ, a summary measure such as net income 
combines two components, cash flows and depreciation expense that will be valued by the market using 
different multipliers.  Hence, if depreciation is biased, accuracy in valuation requires that the summary 
measure (net income) be broken into its components, cash flows and depreciation expense. 
 
We model REIT free cash flows –operating cash flows net of investing cash flows—using the 
same cash flow dynamics as in FO96, but we interpret the parameters as well as the information variable, 
𝑣𝑐𝑡,  as they apply to the REIT business model.  Letting cr refer to operating cash flows and ci refer to 
investing cash flows, we assume the following dynamic relations over time (CFD1): 
𝑐𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝜔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑡+1
𝑐𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑐𝑣𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑡+1
𝑣𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀3,𝑡+1     CFD1 
We interpret the third equation, 𝑣𝑐𝑡, as reflecting supply and demand shocks to real estate.   
 As mentioned above, the parameter ωrr is the persistence of net operating cash receipts (0 ≤ ωrr < 
R) and R is one plus the risk free rate of interest (r).  For REITs, rr captures repeated, but deteriorating 
(or growing) rental flows net of variable costs, as stipulated in long-term rental contracts.  If rr is less 
than 1, then each future rent is less than the previous rent, but, if rr > 1, then rents are growing over time. 
Beyond rr, there are three model variables which stimulate next period’s net operating receipts; these are 
capital investments, (ci), supply and demand shocks to real estate (𝑣𝑐𝑡) and random shocks, (e.g.,ε1,t+1).  
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Capital investments (ci) represent construction of buildings or acquisitions of property, and are 
undertaken to generate new rents one period hence, equal to ωri.  This growth in rents which is stimulated 
by supply and demand shifts (𝑣𝑐𝑡), is further magnified if investing, once stimulated, continues to persist 
at the rate, ωii  (0 ≤ ωii < R).8 One can interpret such persistence as the serial correlation in construction 
costs over several years as real estate projects are developed.  These information dynamics allow 
investing to generate rents. 
  Cyclical supply or demand shocks, 𝑣𝑐𝑡 can influence either cash receipts directly through ωrc, or 
they can influence them indirectly by stimulating investment.   Similar to the implied assumptions about 
cash receipts and capital investment, these supply and demand shocks potentially exhibit persistence (i.e., 
through the parameter cc which may be equal to zero and can be as large as R).  
If supply and demand shocks (𝑣𝑐𝑡) are all zero, our information dynamics are exactly the same as 
FO96 page 212. To keep it simple, we assume, for now, that 𝑣𝑐𝑡 are zero.  Given these cash flow 
dynamics, we can value a REIT using the cash flow variables, ci and cr, at time t.9 However our aim is to 
incorporate valuation in terms of accounting numbers.10  Therefore we convert the cash flow 
fundamentals to accounting numbers via the accounting relation (AR) identities in FO96: 
𝑏𝑣𝑡 = 𝑝𝑒𝑡 + 𝑓𝑎𝑡                                                          (AR1)
𝑝𝑒𝑡 = 𝑝𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡                                       (AR2)
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝𝑒𝑡 − 𝑝𝑒𝑡−1 − 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = −�1 − 𝛿𝑝𝑒�𝑝𝑒𝑡−1      (AR3)
𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡 + (𝑅 − 1)𝑓𝑎𝑡−1                          (AR4).  
 
  
                                                 8 If ii = 0 then there is zero persistence in capital investment. The valuation consequence of investments depends on whether investing is positive net present value (NPV), as discussed later. 9 Defining fa as the fair value of financial assets and applying a discounted free cash flow valuation framework (using CFD1) yields the following, contemporaneous free cash flow valuation equation (FO96, page 213):  
β β= + +t t t t cr t ci tV = fa + vo fa cr ci , where, 
β ω= Φcr r rr  1β η= + Φci iR   
1( )ω −Φ = −r rrR  1( )ω −Φ = −i iiR  1η ω= Φ −r ri . Intuitively, the coefficient on current cash receipts denotes the capitalizing of a smoothly growing or declining stream of rental income.  The coefficient on investment is positive if the discounted cash flows generated by a dollar of investment, 
r riωΦ , exceeds the one dollar cost of the investment, which would implies investments are positive NPV. 10 This allows for the possibility that in an empirical setting, current earnings and book values could provide superior forecasts of future cash flows than that provided by current period cash flows.   
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AR1 separates all assets into two categories; real property, pe which generates rents and potentially 
creates value for REITs, and financial assets, fa which provides a value-neutral return, r.  AR2 is the t-
account expression for net property plant and equipment, while AR3 formalizes our definition of 
depreciation expense. AR4 defines net income for a hypothetical REIT as net rental receipts minus 
depreciation expense and interest. 
 This model defines depreciation, AR3 to be a constant fraction 1- δpe, of beginning of period net 
developed property, similar to the declining balance method. 11  If ppe refers to property, plant and 
equipment, depreciation is -(1 − 𝛿𝑝𝑒)𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑡−1.   FO96 assume firms choose 𝛿𝑝𝑒 and the larger its 
magnitude, the smaller is annual depreciation expense.  Consistent with actual practice, this parameter 
can’t be greater than 1, i.e., 0 < < 1.  If (1- δpe) records the fraction of assets that are expensed each 
period for depreciation, then, it follows that δpe measures the persistence of capitalized assets.  The larger 
is δpe, the more gradual is the assumed decline in the earnings potential of assets. 
Consistent with FO96, valuation Equation (1), expresses REIT value as a linear combination of 
net income, nit, dividends, dt, historical book value of equity, bvt, book value of real property, pet-1 and 
investment, cit. 12 
   γ γ γ γ γ−= + + + +t ni t d t bv t pe t 1 ci tV ni d bv pe ci               (1)  
The valuation weights depend on the parameters of the cash flow dynamics and accounting rules:  
ni r rrRγ ω= Φ  d r rrrγ ω= −Φ  bv r rr1 rγ ω= −Φ  
                                                 11 The “declining balance” depreciation accounting policy parameter, 𝛿𝑝𝑒, is analytically convenient because it causes the asset associated with depreciation to persist in a linear fashion. FO96 show how the main intuition from their model holds with more realistic assumptions, such as straight-line depreciation. 12  This model derives from a residual income valuation, employing both CFD1 and the accounting rules implied by AR1-AR4.  A residual income model sums current book value of equity (bvt) with the discounted stream of expected future residual income (𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝜏𝑎 ).                                   (RIV) Residual income for year t, is measured as net income minus a capital charge on the beginning-of-period book value of equity (nit - rbvt-1).  This valuation relation requires that accounting rules comply with the clean surplus relation (CSR), 𝑏𝑣𝑡 = 𝑏𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡  (e.g. Ohlson [1995]).  
peδ
1
V bv R E (ni )at t t t
τ
ττ
∞ −
+=
= +∑
 12 
pe r rr peR ( )γ ω δ= Φ −              ci iRγ η= Φ   
1( )r rrR ω
−Φ = −               1( )ω −Φ = −i iiR                 1r riη ω= Φ −  
Note that the coefficient on net income, 𝛾𝑛𝑖 depends on the persistence of cash flows (ωrr).  The 
coefficient on lagged real property, 𝛾𝑝𝑒 reflects the difference between the persistence of cash flows (ωrr) 
which can also be thought of as “economic depreciation,” and, the accounting measure of asset 
persistence implied by the choice of depreciation policy (𝛿𝑝𝑒).  The weight on lagged pe,  𝛾𝑝𝑒, is zero if 
the depreciation policy is unbiased so that δpe = ωrr.  Stated differently, under unbiased accounting there is 
no weight on depreciation expense, as captured by pet-1, beyond that which is already reflected in net 
income.13  Looking at AR3, depreciation expense is a linear function of pet-1.  Therefore it is possible to 
specify the equation using either depreciation expense or the book value of real property. 
  Another form of accounting bias is captured in the coefficient on new investments, 𝛾𝑐𝑖.  A 
positive coefficient on investing will occur if the term η , is positive. This term indicates if projects are 
positive net present value (FO96); this occurs, when the present value of the stream of cash flows on a 
dollar of new investments, r riωΦ , is greater than the dollar invested (i.e., the -1 in η ).  This is a form of 
accounting bias because GAAP prevent a REIT from recognizing immediately the future rents associated 
with new investment. Increased rents from positive net present value investment are reflected in market 
value immediately, but appear in the accounting records when recognized in future periods. The weight 
on new investment is zero if a REIT engages in zero NPV projects and it is negative if new projects are 
negative NPV. 
  Equation 1 provides a relatively parsimonious valuation model for a REIT, however, NAREIT 
has promoted the use of the alternative summary measure, FFO, since the early 1990’s.  It is 
straightforward to restate the above model in terms of FFO.  Recall that FFO is roughly net income before 
                                                 13 REITs use the straight-line method to depreciate assets, typically over the maximum allowable life under GAAP (40 years). By choosing a small 1- 𝛿𝑝𝑒, firms are accommodating a relatively high cash flow persistence, 
𝜔𝑟𝑟 .  For example 1- 𝛿𝑝𝑒 equal to 1/40 = .025 would be unbiased if  𝜔𝑟𝑟 is equal to 0.975, implying unbiased accounting if there are highly persistent rental flows.. 
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depreciation and before gains and losses on real estate transactions.14 Since the residual income valuation 
model applies to any accounting model that is consistent with the clean surplus relation, it also works 
with FFO as a measure of income, provided that book value is also measured before accumulated 
depreciation.  This leads to the following alternative formulation of the accounting valuation model.  
,              (2)  
 The valuation weights are as follows: 
   
   
 
In this equation, −= +
ffo ffo
t t 1 tpe pe ci  is the gross book value of real property and 
ffo
tbv  is the book value of 
equity adding back accumulated depreciation.  Notably, all of the coefficients in equation (2) are the same 
as their counterparts in equation (1), except for the coefficient on real property. This coefficient differs 
between Equation (1) and (2) because depreciation expense does not exist in an FFO valuation 
formulation (i.e., δpe = 1).15 
 Under our assumptions, models (1) and (2) are just different representations of the same 
information, so in theory they explain value equally well.  Each can be seen as a baseline model that relies 
on either net income or FFO; however, each contains bias-correcting terms for positive net present value 
investing and for depreciation bias.  They form the basis for our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The net income (Equation 1) and FFO (Equation 2) stationary models of REIT 
valuation including bias correcting terms have equal explanatory power. 
 
This hypothesis is based on a stationary valuation model.  We test this hypothesis in order to tie our 
results back to early studies on REIT valuations.   However, our main interest is in a valuation model that 
                                                 14 While the NAREIT recommended definition of FFO has varied over time (see Appendix A), throughout our sample period it has always been measured before depreciation of real property, and before gains and losses on the sale of real property and extraordinary items.  We measure net income before gains and losses on the sale of property, and we assume these are transitory.  Hence, our theoretical model essentially ignores them. 15 It is relatively easy to show that the valuation coefficients on 𝑝𝑒𝑡−1ffo  and 𝑏𝑣𝑡−1ffo   are both equal to zero if cash receipts have persistence equal to 1 (i.e., if ωrr = 1). In this case, assets do not grow or decline in value implying economic depreciation is zero,, and ffo along with investing cash flows are sufficient to explain value.     
ffo ffo
t ffo t d,ffo t bv,ffo t pe,ffo t 1 ci,ffo tV ffo d bv pe ciγ γ γ γ γ−= + + + +
ffo r rr niRγ ω γ= Φ = d,ffo r rr drγ ω γ= −Φ = bv,ffo r rr bv1 rγ ω γ= −Φ =
pe,ffo r rrR ( 1)γ ω= Φ − ci,ffo i ciRγ η γ= Φ =
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allows for time variation in model parameters.  Tests of hypothesis 1 provide baseline results to help 
judge the benefits of using a more complex valuation model with time variation in parameters.  
3.2  FO96 with Time Varying Parameters 
 A key idea explored in this paper is that bias in depreciation expense, reflected in the difference 
between ωrr and δpe, can vary with real estate cycles.  For example, not all rental contracts renew in the 
same year, so the effect of a supply or demand shock to cash receipts can imply a change in the 
persistence parameter.16 Time variation in the persistence of cash receipts (ωrr), will cause valuation 
coefficients containing ωrr, most notably the coefficients on ni, ffo, and lagged pe, to increase (in absolute 
value) as real estate markets expand.  
 To adjust the theoretical framework for time-varying weights, we use Equation (1), and 
decompose net income into two components, ffo and depreciation expense, nit = ffot + deprt.  This allows 
depreciation expense to replace lagged pet in Equation (1), through AR3.  We also relax the assumption 
that real estate supply and demand shocks,𝑣𝑐𝑡, in CFD1 are equal to zero.  These steps lead to a restated 
and expanded version of Equation (1), labelled Equation (1a), 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑜 +  𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆𝑑𝑑 + 𝜆𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑣 +  𝜆𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜆𝜈𝑐𝜈𝑐         (1a). 
 This contains new parameters, 𝜆𝑣𝑐 = 𝑟𝜔𝑟𝑐 +𝑖𝜂𝜔𝑖𝑐  and 𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑜 − 𝑅𝑟(1 − 𝛿𝑝𝑒)−1(𝜔𝑟𝑟 −
𝛿𝑝𝑒); the other parameters are the same as in Equation 1.  The weighting on the real estate cycle measure, 
𝑣𝑐𝑡 reflects both rc, which measures its role in generating new rents, as well as ic, its role in generating 
investing. 
 The magnitude of the coefficient on depreciation expense depr is the same as the coefficient on 
ffo if depreciation expense is unbiased (i.e., 𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 𝛿𝑝𝑒 ) implying that the two components could be 
combined into one measure, net income.  However, the valuation weight on depreciation expense is less 
than the weight on ffo if accounting depreciation overstates economic depreciation (i.e., 𝜔𝑟𝑟 > 𝛿𝑝𝑒). In 
fact, if 𝜔𝑟𝑟 > 1, and 𝛿𝑝𝑒 < 1 the weight on depreciation expense is negative, indicating each dollar of 
                                                 16 Long-term rentals can take up to ten years to fully adjust to a change in demand. 
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depreciation actually translates into a higher market value. This occurs when REIT fundamentals are 
consistent with growing cash flows from the asset, while accounting rules require a depreciation charge 
that reduces the asset’s book value.  In such cases economic depreciation is positive, but accounting 
depreciation is negative.  The market must undo the bias by placing a positive weight on depreciation 
expense.   
So far, the model is stationary although, Equation 1a allows for a real estate shock to be observed 
by the market and incorporated into valuations.  To obtain time varying valuation weights, we assume the 
parameters in CFD1 (e.g., ωrr) are subscripted with time t and vary with the real estate cycle as follows: 
    ωh,t = ωh,E + φh × cyclet                   (CFD2) 
In CFD2, ωh,t are time-varying parameters (where h = rr, ii, allowing for possible cyclicality in persistence 
of cash receipts and investing); cyclet is a state variable for the period t phase of the real estate cycle, 
which fluctuates around a mean of zero; ωh,E is a parameter measuring the long-term equilibrium of the 
real estate market (where cyclet = 0); and φh is the sensitivity of ωh,t  to cycle at date t.   With CFD2, the 
coefficients in Equation 1a take on an additional time subscript (e.g., 𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑜,𝑡). Unfortunately, this 
modification to the original cash flow dynamics leads to valuation coefficients which are not linear in 
cycle (Appendix B).  Equation 3 below provides a linear approximation (achieved through the use of 
second order Taylor series approximations) to the valuation model that this modification yields.   
λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ λ
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
t ffo ,E ffo ,C t t depr ,E depr ,C t t d ,E d ,C t t
bv ,E bv ,C t t ci ,E ci ,C t t vc ,E vc ,C t ct
V ( cycle ) ffo ( cycle )depr ( cycle )d
( cycle )bv ( cycle )ci ( cycle )v         (3) 
Note this is just Equation 1a,  modified so that the valuation weight on each explanatory variable can vary 
with cycle.17 We are interested in the coefficients on ffo and on depr repeated here from Appendix B for 
convenience. (Again, the subscript E represents a long term equilibrium coefficient while the subscript C 
indicates the portion of the valuation coefficient which changes with cycles): 
                                                 17 This will be captured empirically through interactions between a proxy for “cycle” and the other independent variables in Equation 1a.   
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λffo,E = r,E rr ,ER ωΦ  λdepr,pe,E = 
1
ffo,E r ,E pe rr ,E peR (1 ) ( )λ δ ω δ
−− Φ − −  
 λffo,C = 2 2r ,E rrR ϕΦ    λdepr,pe,C = 
1
ffo,C pe pe(r / R) (1 )λ δ δ
−− −   
where      1r ,E rr ,E(R )ω
−Φ = − . 
 
The long term equilibrium valuation weight on ffot, λffo, E, is very nearly the same as the valuation 
weight on net income, nit, in the stationary model (Equations 1 and 1a).  The main difference is that rr,E, 
the equilibrium persistence of cash receipts now replaces rr.  The long term equilibrium weight on deprt, 
λdepr, E,  deviates from the weight on depreciation expense in Equation 1a for this same reason.
 
The time-varying portion of the valuation weight on ffot,  λffo,C, increases in the sensitivity of the 
persistence of operating cash receipts to cycle, φrr from CFD2.18  If this sensitivity is pro-cyclical (φrr > 0) 
the valuation weight on ffot will be pro-cyclical (λffo,C  > 0).  Importantly, the valuation weights on ffot and 
deprt have opposite sensitivities to cyclet.  Intuitively, the time-varying valuation weight on deprt is 
counter-cyclical because δpe represents a fixed accounting policy for REITs, invariant to changes in the 
real estate cycle.  In contrast, ωrr is now able to vary due to factors that drive real estate cycles (e.g., 
construction lags and delayed contract renewals).   Our second two hypotheses are based on these 
arguments. 
Hypothesis 2 The sensitivity of the coefficient on FFO to cycle (i.e., the weighting on the 
interaction of cycle and FFO) is positive. 
 
Hypothesis 3 The sensitivity of the coefficient on depreciation expense to cycle (i.e., the 
weighting applied to the interaction of cycle with depr) is negative.  
 
 As mentioned, the negative depreciation valuation sensitivity for REITs derives from our 
assumption (based on actual practice) that REITs have a fixed depreciation policy for buildings; typically 
these are amortized using the straight line method over 40 years.  Feasibly, tension in H3 is created to the 
extent that the depreciation policy is not fixed.   For example, if depreciation expense could respond to 
asset use (e.g., units of production depreciation or depletion), and if this occurs when the asset is truly 
                                                 18 The cyclical weights, captured by the interaction of ffo (depr) with cycle, can be derived by differentiating the expression for the long term equilibrium weight on ffo (depr) with respect to cycle. 
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being used up, then the valuation of such depreciation expense could be positive.  These are not the type 
of assets that dominate the operations of a REIT, but they do exist in other industries, such as the resource 
industry. Therefore, H3 is more likely to be rejected in such a non-REIT setting.  
Hypothesis 4 In non-REIT settings where depreciation policies and assets are similar to those of 
REIT’s (e.g., hotels and restaurants) depreciation valuation will be more biased than in industry 
settings such as the extractive sector, where asset allocation methods are responsive to revenues 
and the economic use of the asset. 
 
4.  Research Design Choices, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Adaption of the Models for Empirical Application and Variable Measurement  
 In order to test H1-H4 we estimate empirical versions of the models in equations (1) to (3).  
Intercepts and error terms are added and we scale all variables by the number of shares outstanding.  
These modifications control for uncorrelated omitted variables and heteroscedasticity, and facilitate 
comparisons to prior studies. 
The variables used in the empirical versions of equations (1) and (2) are defined in Appendix C. 
The dependent variable, Pt, is stock price 90 days after the end of year t.  Funds from operations per share 
(FFOt) and net income per share (NIt) for  year t are the earnings measures in the two models.  We use 
two different FFO measures: reported FFO which is collected from IBES actuals19  and FFOCOMP  
which is an estimate of FFO constructed as Compustat net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations, and, before depreciation expense.20   
 The variable BVt in equation (1) denotes the book value of common equity per share at time t. In 
equation (2) BVtffo is the book value of common equity per share, adding back accumulated depreciation 
per share.  Similarly, the depreciation bias correction term in equation (1) is PEt-1, real property (including 
                                                 19 Reported FFO can include items beyond CFO and working capital accruals. For example, in 1999, the NAREIT recommended to its member companies that all non-recurring items, except for gains or losses on the sale of property and extraordinary items, should be included in FFO. Possibly, analysts could restate the 10-K, NAREIT version of FFO, to exclude non-property transitory items to improve forecasting accuracy (Bhattacharya et al. 2003).  Similar to Baik et al. who examine 63 REIT disclosures, we examined 21 REITs (173 firm-years) and confirm the distributions are very similar. 20 For REITs, discontinued operations contain gains and losses on sale of properties; therefore, empirically both net income and FFO are free from the influence of transitory items associated with the sale of real property, allowing us to focus on the influence of depreciation expense. 
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land), net of accumulated depreciation; in equation (2) PEt-1ffo  is measured before accumulated 
depreciation. As in prior research common dividend per share declared for fiscal year t (DIVt) is used as a 
proxy for net dividend per share.21 Our capital investment  proxy (INVt) is net cash flows from investing 
activities (from the statement of cash flows) per share multiplied by –1; hence, capital spending outflows 
are positive in sign. 
 Equation 3 is estimated using the following empirical representation, Equation (4). 
0 1 7 t COMP, 2 8 t 3 9
4 10 5 11 6
( CYCLE ) FFO ( CYCLE ) DEPR ( CYCLE ) BV
( CYCLE ) DIV ( CYCLE ) INV CYCLE
t t t t t
t t t t t t
P γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ ε
= + + × + + × + + ×
+ + × + + × + × +
      (4) 
Estimation of Equation 4 requires a proxy for cycle and the shock term in Equation 3, νct .    We develop 
one empirical proxy to capture both constructs,  labeled CYCLE.  By interacting CYCLE with the other 
explanatory variables, the coefficients on the interactions between CYCLE and FFO (CYCLE and 
depreciation) in equation 4 allow us to test H2 (H3). Although equation 3 might suggest including the 
square of CYCLE, equation 4 omits this term.22  
 The proxy for the real estate cycle phase for fiscal year t (CYCLEt) is a weighted sum of   filtered 
measures of three real estate market variables, capturing common-real estate cycle information (Appendix 
D). These real estate market variables include the total return index for real estate, the supply-demand gap 
for commercial real property, and the housing starts index. Using a filtering technique developed by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997), we take the twelve month moving average of the cyclical components of the 
time-series of these three variables. Finally a composite index is formed using principle components 
(Panel D, Figure 1).  
4.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 describes the sample formation which spans the period 1995-2008.  Panel A describes the 
sample selection procedure for testing our main hypotheses.  Accounting data from COMPUSTAT is 
                                                 21 In our theoretical model net dividends (dt) is common dividends less net capital contributions (e.g. share repurchases); however, capital contributions is frequently missing in Compustat. 22 We exclude CYCLE squared out of concern with the extremity of the trough in 2008.  Our results are qualitatively similar if we include this term in our regressions. 
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merged with stock price and return data from CRSP, and FFO data from the I/B/E/S summary file (SIC 
code = 6798–6799, REITs). Mortgage REITs and hybrid REITs are excluded because depreciation 
expense is not a material component of earnings for these REITs (Vincent 1999). Observations with 
missing values of regression variables or zero depreciation expense are also deleted resulting in a sample 
of 1,116. To mitigate the effects of extreme outliers, we exclude observations with variables outside the 
mean ±3 standard deviations. The final sample is 1064 firm years for 157 REITs.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the samples used to estimate the valuation models. 
Mean price per share is $27.22,  a little less than double the book value of equity per share, of $14.88; this 
is the difference that FO96 captures through its model of future growth opportunities and conservative 
accounting. The mean FFO per share of $2.27 is greater than common dividend per share ($1.63) and net 
income per share ($0.94). The distribution of FFO and CFO are very similar, suggesting that changes in 
working capital, estimated as the difference between FFO and CFO, are relatively minor. In some tests we 
separate the depreciable component of real property by measuring land versus buildings.  The developed 
component of real property (BUILD) averages $31.16 per share in comparison to just $7.22 for land.   
In the final nine rows of Table 2, Panel A, we report the data profile for a matched sample of non-
REIT firms.   One-to-one matching on the ratio of property, plant and equipment (including land) to total 
assets (FIXED) locates non-REIT firms that are nearly identical in their concentration of real property to 
assets.  However, the non-REIT firms are of smaller scale with lower cash flow per share (REIT’s $2.46 
versus non-REIT’s $1.77), and lower book value of equity (i.e., REIT average BV $14.88, non-REIT 
$7.47).  In addition, the non-REIT sample pays lower dividends per share, and more than half are non-
dividend paying firms. Panel B shows the concentration of industries that occurs when non-REIT firms 
are matched to REIT firms based on fixed asset ratios.  As shown, the non-REIT matched sample includes 
a high concentration of extractive firms, along with restaurants, hotels, transportation firms and utilities. 
Panel A, Table 3 reports simple correlation coefficients between market and accounting data for 
REITs. Stock prices are more strongly correlated with FFO than with dividends, CFO, or net income. 
Dividends are more strongly correlated with FFO (0.77) than with net income (0.51). There is a negative 
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simple correlation between stock price and depreciation expense (-0.37), implying REITs with more 
depreciation have higher stock prices. 
Panel B, Table 3 reports the correlation between the real estate cycle proxy, macroeconomic 
variables, and discount rates. The real estate cycle proxy is positively correlated with GDP growth and 
risk-free discount rates, and it is negatively correlated with the term premium on government bonds and 
the default spread on corporate bonds. Hence, the real estate cycle proxies are correlated with, but are not 
the same as, general business cycles. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Testing H1 FO96 model works equally well for net income versus FFO 
Table 4 presents an empirical analysis of REIT valuation based on net income and IBES FFO 
respectively using the full sample, column (a) and two sub-sample periods which align with prior 
research, 1995-1999 (column (b)) and 2000-2008 (column (c)). The Vuong z-statistic comparing 
explanatory power across the two models provides a formal test of H1 and is reported at the bottom of the 
Table.  Based on this statistic, we reject H1 for the full sample, and for the post-2000 period, but not for 
the pre-2000 period.  Consistent with early studies (e.g., Vincent [1998] and Fields et al. [1997]), for the 
pre-2000 period, the net income version of FO96 is statistically indistinguishable from the FFO version.  
Consistent with more recent studies (e.g., Baik et al.), explanatory power shifts in favor of FFO in the 
post 2000 period.  This table suggests that shifting conclusions regarding the value relevance of FFO and 
net income are not due to omissions of bias terms in prior research.  
Nevertheless, Table 4 results suggest that failing to consider this bias can be important.  
Specifically, there is no indication of depreciation bias in the pre-2000 sub-period (the valuation weight 
on PEt-1 does not differ from zero in the pre-2000 period) in the net income formulation, while the weight 
is positive and statistically significant in the post-2000 period.   The depreciation bias correction term in 
the FFO model is negative and marginally significant in each sub-period, but not in the overall sample.  A 
negative coefficient suggests that the market favors a small depreciation charge, in the presence of the 
FFO measure. Of course, the post 2000 period comprises both upswings and downswings in demand for 
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real estate, so constraining coefficients on depreciation to be inter-temporarily constant within this sub-
period is likely to be inappropriate and could lead to false conclusions regarding the irrelevance of 
depreciation.  The analysis for H2 and H3 will relax this assumption. 
There are two other observations from Table 4 that are pertinent with respect to our framework.  
The positive and significant coefficient on investing cash flows suggests these are value-creating on 
average for REITs.  Investing cash flows are included to accommodate and control for growth, a control 
which is necessary because accounting measures such as earnings and book value do not recognize future 
rents.   Second, several FO96 model restrictions are violated in Table 4.  The model intercepts should be 
zero, but this restriction is violated in the pre-2000 period for the net income model and in the post-2000 
period for the FFO model.23  In addition, the coefficient on dividends is positive and significant, but the 
FO96 model predicts a small negative coefficient in this specification.24  While the FO96 model offers us 
a structure for tests, it is probably unrealistic to expect that all restrictions will be met. In fact, 
hypothesized non-stationarity of valuation weights, tested through H2 and H3, could contribute to model 
violations.  
To summarize, Table 4 confirms Hypothesis 1 for the first sub-period from1995-1999, but not in 
the post 2000 period. Baik et al. [2008] propose that the shift towards an FFO valuation model is due to 
changes in the definition of FFO, and increased disclosures that made this number more comparable 
across REITs.  Kang and Zhao [2010] add to this discussion highlighting the potential bias due to 
depreciation expense in net income.  We contend that real estate cycles became more variable following 
2000 (Figure 1).  Hence, bias in depreciation is likely to be greater in the post-2000 period, confounding 
inferences on whether greater reliance on FFO in valuation changes due to the re- defining of FFO by 
                                                 23 Begley, Chamberlain and Li demonstrate that a non-zero intercept can imply a failure to capture all value generating activities in the cash flow dynamics. 24 Assuming the coefficient on book value in column (a) is correct, (0.22), the coefficient on dividends should be -0.88, rather than the estimated number of 7.74. The likely reason for this violation of coefficient restrictions is that in the REIT setting dividends act as an “other information” variable that predicts future cash flows or FFO. Lo and Lys [2000] suggest this result occurs due to omitting size as an additional explanatory variable.  However, including size in Table 4 does not lead to negative sign on dividends in our sample. 
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NAREIT (proposed by Baik et al.), or if the shift is due to cyclical biases induced by macro-economic 
shocks which are omitted from Table 4.  We address this issue in Table 7. 
5.2 Testing H2 and H3—Is depreciation bias countercyclical? 
Table 5 presents our main tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 exploring whether valuation coefficients in 
REITs vary with cycles.  Recall we test these two hypotheses using variations on equation 1a which 
breaks net income into funds from operation and depreciation expense.  In addition, starting with Table 5 
we use a self-constructed FFO--FFOCOMP.25  
Columns (a) and (b) of Table 5 begin the analysis by showing the combined effect of adding a 
proxy for real estate cycle to equation 1 (i.e., equation 1a), with and without the CYCLE interactive 
terms.  In column (a) the coefficient on CYCLE is positive and statistically significant with a point 
estimate, 4.97.  At the mean of CYCLE reported in Table 2, 0.15, this adds about $0.75 to the average 
price per share. A one standard deviation in CYCLE of 1.05, increases the effect to about $5.22 or about 
19% of average price. The addition of CYCLE increases the adjusted r-squared of 0.44 reported in Table 
4 column (a), to 0.54 in Table 5 column (a). Note that the weights on FFO and depreciation are very 
different from each other in this regression (see the second to last row of the Table that shows this 
difference is statistically significant), indicating that it is not appropriate to place a single weight on both 
components of net income . 
  In column (b), we allow all of the coefficients to interact with the cycle proxy.  The base 
coefficients on FFOCOMP and DEPR are positive and statistically significant with point estimates of $5.15 
and $1.29.  This is similar to column (a).  The significant coefficient on depreciation in this column also 
implies that using the summary measure funds from operations, alone, is incomplete.  The positive weight 
on DEPR suggests the role for a small deduction for depreciation expense in the presence of FFOCOMP. At 
the average FFOCOMP , the impact on REIT value is $12.51 per share ($2.43 x $5.15) while the average  
valuation effect of depreciation expense is -$1.92 (-$1.49 x 1.29).  
Turning to the question of whether the coefficients vary cyclically, the weighting on FFOCOMP 
                                                 25  Results of Table 5 are very similar if we continue to use FFO from IBES. 
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interacted with CYCLE is positive, 1.30, and statistically significant, consistent with H2. At the average  
FFO per share and average measure of cycle, the total effect of this interaction is small, $0.47 (0.15 x 2.43 
x 1.30).  However, holding means constant, a one standard deviation shift in cycle increases the effect to 
about $3.82  ([1.06 + .15] x 2.43 x.1.30) per share.   
In contrast to the positive cyclicality on FFO, the coefficient on depreciation expense, interacted 
with CYCLE, is negative and statistically significant (-1.43).   This is consistent with H3. At the average 
depreciation expense (-$1.49 per share), a one standard deviation movement in Cycle (1.06) results in a 
$2.57 per share add-back to the baseline average effect of -$1.92, computed above.  Finally, the adjusted 
r-squared of 0.44 reported in the first column of Table 4 (the net income version of FO96) can be 
compared to the adjusted r-squared in Table 5, column (b) of 0.58.  Hence, adding CYCLE to the 
stationary FO96 model increases the model fit by 32% ([.58-.44]/.44).   
Columns (c) to (f) provide sensitivity analyses and insight to these basic results.  Columns (c) and 
(d)  pull FFO apart into its cash flow component and a proxy for changes in working capital (FFOCOMP -
CFO).26  In the full interactive model, column (d), the proxy for working capital accruals has a multiplier 
of $2.86 (versus the coefficient on CFO of $5.57).27  An unreported statistical test reveals that these two 
coefficients are not equal.   However, the interactive coefficient on this proxy for accruals with CYCLE 
does not differ from zero, and the inclusion of this   has little impact on inferences regarding the 
cyclicality of depreciation bias. 
Columns (e) and (f) separate land assets from depreciable real property. (Land values were hand 
collected from 10-K statements.) By allowing for a separate coefficient on land, we implicitly allow δpe to 
differ for land assets (not subject to accounting depreciation) versus building assets.  Column (f) shows 
                                                 26 Given the definition of FFOCOMP in Appendix C, FFOCOMP-CFO includes both working capital accruals and long term operating accruals (other than depreciation).  However for the purpose of brevity we refer to this as “working capital accruals.” 27 Christiansen and Feltham Chapter 10 pp 340-342 extend the FO 96 model to include working capital accruals. This extension to the model requires a measure of the level of working capital in the model.  Accordingly we add this variable, WCt-1 to all regressions that include FFO-CFO.  Note that empirically working capital accruals are a minor portion of accruals for REITs (see Table 2), and including them in the formal model would complicate this paper without adding much insight.  
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that this formulation leads CFO to have a positive but insignificant interactive coefficient with CYCLE, 
but that depreciation continues to exhibit counter-cyclicality in its valuation weight.  In addition, the 
coefficient on LAND is positive and significant (0.73), as is the empirical weighting on the interaction 
between land and cycle (0.29).  Recall from our theoretical model that depreciation expense and buildings 
are linearly related.  Therefore we do not include buildings in this model.  
 Finally, as in the stationary model contained in Table 4, investment (INV) shows a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient in most estimations (column (c) is the exception) confirming that 
investment is a positive net present value undertaking in this industry.  The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction of investment with CYCLE is negative (e.g., -0.13 in column b), but differs from zero at the 
10% level, in just one of the three model specifications.  Our interpretation is that the marginal return to 
investing cash flows is not altered with real estate demand shocks. Note also, as in Table 4, dividends 
exhibit large positive coefficients, and these too are unaffected by the phase of the real estate cycle.   
5.3 Testing H4--Cyclicality in non-REIT firms. 
Our application of the FO96 framework assumes that the major accrual for REITs is depreciation 
expense, and that real property is the major asset generating a REIT’s value (i.e., CFD1).  This section 
explores whether results on cyclicality of valuation weights generalize to other firms that are also likely to 
generate value from real property, H4.  Recall from Table 2 panel C that the matched control firms are 
clustered in the following sectors: 44% in extractive industries (e.g., petroleum, coal etc.),  19% 
transportation Firms (e.g., airlines), 19% restaurants and hotels, 10% utilities, and 8% entertainment (e.g., 
casinos and movie theaters).  
 In Table 6 Panel A, we report the results of estimating equation 4 for these matched non-REIT 
firm-years, using the implementation of this equation from Table 5 columns (c) and (d) where net income 
is decomposed into cash flow from operations, an estimate of working capital accruals and depreciation 
expense. This specification was selected because non-REIT firms because we are unsure whether the 
valuation weight on working capital accruals is the same as the weighting on CFO.  In addition, we have 
not hand-collected land values for these firms. Comparing column (a), REITS, to column (c) non-REITs,  
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the non-REIT firm sample exhibits a lower average valuation weight on CFO (4.54) versus the REIT 
CFO weight (5.78) suggesting that the persistence of cash flows is lower for the non-REIT sample.  
However, the estimated valuation weights on depreciation differ to an even greater degree for the non-
REIT versus REIT firms.  For the non-REIT sample, the weight on depreciation expense is a statistically 
significant 3.20, in comparison to a statistically insignificant, 0.97 for REIT firms.  While depreciation 
expense is conservatively biased for non-REITS (the difference is shown in the second to last row of 
column (c) ).  For REITs the difference is much greater (4.81 versus 1.34).  In addition turning to column 
(d), there is no evidence of cyclicality in valuation parameters for the non-REIT firms.28    
The conclusions we draw with regard to this analysis are both similar to, and different from, Kang 
and Zhao [2010].  Similar to Kang and Zhao we conclude that for non-REIT firms, the market treats 
depreciation expense consistent with its capturing an economic decline in the value of the asset; for 
REITs this is true to a lesser degree. However, we add to the former study by highlighting the role of 
supply and demand shocks for  REIT firms.  REIT firms show pro-cyclical persistence in cash flows, and 
also countercyclical behavior of the valuation weight on depreciation.   If we were limited to the evidence 
in Kang and Zhao [2010] we might be tempted to conclude that reliance on FFO alone, as a valuation 
metric, is justified because the market undoes the coefficient on accumulated depreciation that would 
otherwise be blended into the book value of equity.29 Our specification that is more directly tied to the 
FO96 model, shows in both Table 4 and Table 5, that the adjustment depends on the stage of the real 
estate cycle. 
 Kang and Zhao argue that the difference in valuation between the two sectors is due to REIT 
properties being financial assets, whereas in other industries their properties are operating assets (page 
228).  The FO96 framework can be used to add subtly to this explanation.   
                                                 28 One challenge is comparing the CYCLE-interacted columns (b) to (d) is that our measure of CYCLE is tailored to the REIT industry.  This would bias the non-REIT sector interactive coefficients towards zero. 29 Note that Kang and Zhao focus on a model containing accumulated depreciation and the book value of equity to draw this conclusion.  We rely on FO96 more directly and compare depreciation expense on cash flows from operations.  In untabulated results we have replicated the research design exactly as shown in Kang and Zhao.  We are able to document results very similar to Table 4, using their model. 
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   Within the FO96 framework, valuation differences for depreciation expense between non-REIT 
and REIT firms depend on their respective depreciation policies δpe relative to the persistence of cash 
flows, 𝜔𝑟𝑟, and the degree to which the two parameters co-vary over time.  Inspection of the sectors 
included in our non-REIT industries suggests there are good reasons for δpe to exhibit less bias in the 
control sample.  In the extractive industries that comprise 44% of our control sample, depreciation, 
(which includes depletion of properties like mines), responds to the using up of extractive assets.  This 
naturally causes the “depreciation policy” to track the revenues of extractive firms, as assets are pulled 
from wells or mines and sold. A smaller percentage, 10% of the non-REIT sample, comprises regulated 
utilities.  In this setting pricing policies are often set by regulators to “recover” all allocated expenses 
including depreciation.  This would tend again to cause δpe and 𝜔𝑟𝑟 to vary together.  The remaining 
industry sectors, predominantly hotels and entertainment, are harder to explain and seem to be more like 
REITs.30   
We test this hypothesis in Table 6 panel B where the non-REIT firms are split into two sub-
samples: (i) Entertainment, restaurants and hotels; and (ii) Extractive including oil and gas and mining.   
The first subsample is meant to capture firms with high levels of fixed assets that we suppose are using 
similar depreciation techniques to REITs.  The second subsample employs depletion which allows the 
historical allocation of costs to move with usage.  The results support our fourth hypothesis.  As shown in 
the second to last row under column (e), depreciation in the extractive setting receives the same valuation 
weight (4.19) as the coefficient on cash flows (4.20), whereas the coefficient on depreciation in the first 
subsample (4.72) has a different and lower coefficient than the coefficient on cash flows (6.85).   Thus, 
these results suggest the differences between the valuation coefficients on depreciation for REITs versus 
non-REITs observed in panel A, are at least partially due to differences in depreciation methods.  
                                                 30 There is also a difference in the vocabulary in our paper versus Kang and Zhao.  In the FO96 world, real property of a REIT is an “operating asset” because of its potential to generate value via positive NPV investing. Financial assets in the FO96 framework earn a value neutral return.  We doubt that Kang and Zhao meant, by labelling REIT assets as financial, that they believe these assets would not be able to earn positive rents.  However, we still are unclear about the specific explanation given by Kang and Zhao for differences in depreciation valuation for REITs versus non-REITS, offered in this prior paper.  
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5.2 Confounding effects of the NAREIT (1999) regulation and discount rates 
Table 5 provides convincing evidence that the valuation mapping between accounting information 
and market values for REITs changes over time, with real estate cycles.  Table 7 analyses the robustness 
of our explanation for this time variation in the face of two other confounding factors.  First, as pointed 
out by Baik et al. [2008], regulatory changes implemented by NAREIT in the definition and reliability of 
FFO present a reason for the shift in the valuation model shown in Table 4.  We wondered if an 
alternative explanation for this shift is changes in the bias due to depreciation that accompanied the more 
variable cycles seen in the macro economy after 2000.  This is addressed in Table 7.  Second, the 
valuation weights on performance measures and depreciation expense should vary inversely with the risk 
free rate (Kothari and Shanken [2003] or Johnson [1999]).  Hence an alternative explanation for time-
variation in valuation weights, beyond changing persistence, is changes in interest rates.  This issue is 
addressed in Table 8. 
In Table 7 and 8, we estimate the following regression model: 
   9
0 1 2 t 3 t1
( CYCLE )t i i i it tiP X zγ γ γ γ ε== + + + +∑    (5) 
where zit refers to CFOt, FFO–CFOt, DEPRt, BVt, DIVt, WCt-1, INVt, and CYCLEt; and Xt  is either REGt , 
an indicator variable equal to zero for the pre-NAREIT regulatory period (1995–1999) and one for the 
post-NAREIT period (2000–2008), or it is YIELDTB10Y,t, the yield to maturity on a U.S. 10-year Treasury 
bond at the end of year t, less its mean over the sample period.   For completeness we show in these 
Tables the effects for non-REIT firms as well. 
Results in Table 7, columns (a) and (b) indicate that the real estate-cycle effect reported in Table 
5 is robust to the confounding effects of NAREIT (1999) regulation. In column (b), the positive 
coefficient on CFOt×CYCLEt supports the pro-cyclicality of the valuation weight on CFO (H3). The 
negative coefficient on DEPRt×CYCLEt confirms the counter-cyclicality of the valuation weight on 
depreciation expense (H3).  At the same time, the significantly positive coefficients on CFOt×REGt and 
suggest that the NAREIT (1999) or other post-2000 institutional changes had a significantly positive 
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impact on the valuation weights on CFO.  Consistent with conclusions drawn by Baik et al., the 
significantly negative coefficient on DEPRt×REGt  suggests that NAREIT (1999) regulation coincided 
with market valuations that rely more on FFO and less on net income, as a valuation measure. In general 
the Table suggests a shift consistent with NAREIT’s redefining of FFO leading to an increased valuation 
weight on FFO, as well as, support for our hypothesis that the valuation of depreciation changes in cycles.  
The results in Table 9 provide a similar message with respect to the confounding effects of 
interest rates valuation weights.  As expected, the coefficients on CFO, FFO-CFO and DEPR all vary 
negatively in interest rates.  In column (b) we see that this effect does not swamp out the pro-cyclical 
effect of the weighting on cash flows.  However, the coefficient on depreciation expense interacted with 
the interest rate variable, while negative, is not statistically significant.  This inability to separate the 
interactive denominator impact of interest rates from the interactive valuation weight of depreciation 
expense and CYCLE could be due to the expectation of negative sign for both effects.  
6. Conclusion   
 This study investigates whether real estate cycles affect valuations weights on components of net 
income and FFO in a REIT setting.  We interact the coefficients of an off-the-shelf valuation model 
proposed by FO96 with a continuous proxy variable that reflects real estate supply and demand.  The 
model suggests that if valuation weights on the cash flow component of net income or FFO are pro-
cyclical, the weight on depreciation expense should be countercyclical, consistent with the fixed 
depreciation policy used by REIT firms.  Our evidence consistently supports these hypotheses.  Our 
model allows us to separate cyclicality in valuation weights due to cash flow fundamentals from biases 
due to depreciation policies.  
 An analysis of a matched sample of non-REIT firms provides an additional benchmark for these 
results.  High fixed asset, non-REIT firms demonstrate considerably less depreciation bias than do REIT 
firms..  The FO96 model should apply to both sets of firms.  We supply evidence that the reason for 
differences in valuation weights derives from the use of an inflexible depreciation policy for REITs  
versus the activity-based methods used in the extractive industries that dominate the non-REIT sample.  
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This explanation provides new insights to prior similar results in Kang and Zhao [2010]. 
 We show that depreciation bias is not static over the period 1995-2008.  This expands on the 
analysis of REITs, not only relative to Kang and Zhao [2010] but also relative to Baik et al. [2008].   Baik 
et al. (2008) propose that the NAREIT (1999) regulation enhances the reliability of FFO disclosure, 
enabling investors to rely more on FFO in valuation. This study finds that the real estate cycles and, to the 
extent that the NAREIT (1999) regulation can be captured by a post-2000 dummy variable, both 
contribute to shifts in the relative explanatory power of FFO and net income across the sample periods 
used in prior studies.  
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Figure 1 The cyclical pattern in the real estate market variables 
Panel A. The NCREIF total market return for commercial real estate 
 
Panel B. The excess demand for commercial real estate 
 
Panel C. The natural logarithm of housing starts 
 
Panel D. The real estate cycle proxy (cyclet) 
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Figure 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel E. A composite index of the (raw) real estate market variables 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the cyclical pattern in the real estate market variables. Panel A shows the time series of the NCREIF total return for commercial 
real estate. The data is denominated in percentage points. The data is available at the NCREIF. The original data for a quarter is constant for three 
months within the quarter. Panel B shows the time series of the excess demand for commercial real estate. This variable is measured as the 
difference between the demand index and supply index for commercial real estate. The demand and supply indices are set at 100 as of January 
1984. The original data for a quarter is constant for three months within the quarter. The data are obtained at the MIT center of real estate. Panel C 
shows the time series of the natural logarithm of housing starts. Housing starts are set at 100 as of January 1972. The data is obtained at the 
Federal Reserve Bank at Saint Louis. Panel D shows the time series of the composite index for real estate cycle (CYCLEt). The red line indicates 
the first principal component of the cyclical components of the NCREIF total return, the excess demand for commercial real property, and housing 
starts. The cyclical component of each real estate market variable is extracted using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. The black thick line 
indicates smoothed line of CYCLEt that fits CYCLEt to a 6th order polynomial with regard to time t. The fitted regression has R-squared of 0.863. 
Panel E shows the time series of an alternative composite index for real estate cycle (CYCLEa,t). The red line indicates the first principal 
component of the NCREIF total return, the excess demand for commercial real property, and housing starts (not their cyclical components). The 
black thick line indicates smoothed line of CYCLEt that fits CYCLEt to a 6th order polynomial with regard to time t. The fitted regression has R-
squared of 0.948.
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Appendix A. Changes in the regulatory definition of FFO  
 
Funds from operation, generally speaking is GAAP earnings before depreciation expense, before gains 
and losses on the sale of real property and before extraordinary items.   However, the measure is only 
quasi-mandated and REITs have developed idiosyncratic definitions, tailored to a particular year’s events.  
The following table indicates whether, relative to GAAP net income an item was designated by NAREIT 
or the SEC to exclude (O) or include (X) this item.  For example, depreciation expense on real property 
has always been excluded (O) from FFO, as has gains and losses on sales of property. In addition, the 
reconciliation of FFO to GAAP net income became mandated in 2002, allowing investors better 
information about the specific items included or excluded by particular REITs. 
 
Items excluded from FFO 1991–1994 1995–1999 2000–2002 2003–2008 
Depreciation expense on real 
property O O O O 
Depreciation expense on 
company office buildings 
and improvements 
O X X X 
Gains or losses on sales of 
property O O O O 
Extraordinary items O O O O 
Impairment losses Not specified O O X 
Other non-recurring items Not specified O X X 
Related regulations NAREIT(1991) NAREIT(1995) NAREIT(1999) NAREIT(1999) 
Reg. G (2002) 
SEC staff position 
(2003) 
Note: The symbol O indicates that an item in the column is not included in calculation of FFO during the 
period indicated at the top of each column. The symbol X indicates that the opposite is true. Regulation G 
(2002) required a non-GAAP performance measure to be reconciled to its closest GAAP performance 
measure. Regulation G also required the definition of FFO to follow the definition of FFO provided by 
NAREIT (1999). See NAREIT (2003) for a summary of the SEC staff position about impairment losses. 
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Appendix B  Coefficients of the time-varying valuation model31  
With time varying coefficients (CFD2) and the expanded version of the net income model: 
  t ffo,t t depr ,pe,t t d,t t bv,t t ci,t t vc,t vc,tV ffo depr d bv ci vλ λ λ λ λ λ= + + + + +                       (2a) 
the valuation weights are: 
ffo,t r ,t rr ,tRλ ω= Φ               1depr ,pe,t ffo,t r ,t rr ,t pe peR ( )(1 )λ λ ω δ δ
−= − Φ − −  
 d,t r ,t rr ,t (R 1)λ ω= −Φ −              bv,t r ,t rr ,t1 (R 1)λ ω= −Φ −  
 ci,t i ,t tRλ η= Φ               vc,t r ,t rc i,t t icλ ω ηω= Φ +Φ   
where   1 1r ,t rr ,t rr ,E rr t(R ) (R cycle )ω ω ϕ
− −Φ = − = − −         1 1i,t ii ,t ii ,E ii t(R ) (R cycle )ω ω ϕ
− −Φ = − = − −     
As the state variable cyclet appears in the denominator of the valuation weights in Eq. 2a they are a non-
linear function of cyclet. We use a Taylor series expansion to approximate a linear function.  
Let λ(cyclet) be the non-linear valuation weight in Eq. 2a with regard to cyclet. We assume that cyclet is 
equal to zero when the real estate market is in long-term equilibrium and that cyclet fluctuates around its 
long-term equilibrium level across valuation dates.  Now, we take a first-order Taylor expansion of 
λ(cyclet) with regard to cyclet at the point of zero (i.e., cyclet = 0). Then, λ(cyclet) will be approximated to 
a linear function of cyclet at the point of zero such that λ(cyclet) = λ(0) + (∂λ(0)/∂cyclet)(cyclet  – 0) where 
λ(0) is the long-term equilibrium valuation weight when cyclet = 0, and ∂λ(0)/∂cyclet is the first-order 
derivative of λ(cyclet) with regard to cyclet at the point of zero. As a result, a valuation weight in Eq. 2a 
will be transformed into     
 z t z,E z,C t(cycle ) cycleλ λ λ= +            (4(a)) 
where:  
 zt             = A value-relevant information, where zt is ffot, deprt, dt, bvt, cit, vct ; 
z t(cycle )λ = The valuation weight on zt ;  
z,Eλ           = The long-term equilibrium component of z t(cycle )λ at the point of zero; and 
z,Cλ           = The sensitivity of z t(cycle )λ to cyclet.  
 
The long-term equilibrium component of a valuation weight (λz,E) can be expressed as: 
ffo,Eλ  = r,E rr ,ER ωΦ  depr ,pe,Eλ
 = 1
cfo,E r ,E pe rr ,E peR (1 ) ( )λ δ ω δ
−− Φ − −  
bv,Eλ  = cfo,E1 (r / R)λ−  d,Eλ  
= 
cfo,E(r / R)λ−  
ci,Eλ  = i,E r ,E ri,ER ( 1)ωΦ Φ −  vc,Eλ
 = 1
ffo,E rr,E vc rc ci,E vc icλ ω ω λ ω
− Φ + Φ  
where 1r,E rr ,E(R )ω
−Φ = − , 1i,E ii,E(R )ω
−Φ = − , and 1vc vc(R )ω
−Φ = − .  
Note that the long-term equilibrium component of valuation weight on CFO (λcfo,E) represents the present 
value of expected future operating cash flows generated from existing properties that were built or 
acquired by past capital investments, when the real estate market is in long-term equilibrium.  
                                                 31 A full derivation of these equations appears in Joo 2013 Appendix B. 
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The long-term equilibrium component of valuation weight on depreciation expense (λdepr,pe,E) equals the 
long-term equilibrium component of valuation weight on FFO less the market’s correction of 
conservative bias in accounting depreciation. If accounting depreciation equals expected economic 
depreciation (1 – δpe = 1 – ωrr,E), the valuation weight on unbiased depreciation expense is equal to that on 
FFO. If accounting depreciation exceeds expected economic depreciation (1 – δpe > 1 – ωrr,E), the market 
places a lower valuation weight on depreciation expense than on FFO in order to correct the conservative 
bias in accounting depreciation.  
The sign of λdepr,pe,E depends on whether the value of real property is expected to appreciate or depreciate 
over the useful life of the property, where λdepr,pe,E is rearranged to 1depr,pe,E r rr,E pe peR (1 ) (1 )λ ω δ δ
−= Φ − − . If 
property value is expected to decline over the useful life of the property (ωrr,E < 1), λdepr,pe > 0. If property 
value is expected to appreciate over the useful life of the property (ωrr,E > 1), λdepr,pe < 0. If property value 
is not expected to change over the useful life of the property (ωrr,E = 1), λdepr,pe = 0. 
The sensitivity of a valuation weight to cyclet (λz,C) can be written as follows:  
ffo,Cλ  = 2 2r ,E rrR ϕΦ  d,Cλ  = cfo,Cr / Rλ−  
depr ,PE,Cλ  = 
1
ffo,C pe pe(r / R) (1 )λ δ δ
−− −  bv,Cλ  = cfo,Cr / Rλ−  
ci,Cλ  = i,E r,E rr r,E rr i,E ii r,E ri,ER ( )( 1)ϕ ϕ ϕ ω Φ Φ + Φ +Φ Φ −   ci,Cλ  = 
1
cfo,C vc rc ci,C vc icRλ ω λ ω
− Φ + Φ  
The sensitivity of the valuation weight on FFO to cyclet is related to the sensitivity of the persistence of 
operating cash flows to cyclet. Recall that the valuation weight on FFO is an increasing function of the 
time-varying persistence of operating cash flows (ωrr,t = ωrr,E + φrrcyclet). If the persistence of operating 
cash flows is pro-cyclical (φrr > 0), the valuation weight on FFO is also pro-cyclical (λffo,C > 0).  
The sign of the cyclical coefficient on depreciation expense is opposite to the coefficient on ffo.  This is 
partly due to the assumption that in practice the accounting depreciation policy does not respond to cycles 
(i.e., the REIT continues to use the same depreciation policy no matter the state of supply and demand.) 
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Appendix C.  Definitions of variables 
Variables in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 
Pt  Closing stock prices (PRC, CRSP monthly file) at the final trading date of the third month 
after the end of fiscal year t. PRC is adjusted to remove the affect of stock splits and 
dividends between the end of fiscal year t and the valuation date. 
NIt  Net income per share, which is measured as income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operation per share less preferred dividends deflated by the number of 
common shares outstanding at the end of year t (COMPUSTAT (ib – dvp)/csho). 
BVt  Book value of common equity per share at the end of year t (COMPUSTAT ceq /csho). 
PEt-1  The book value of real property per share at the end of year t–1 (COMPUSTAT ret / csho). 
If ret is missing, we hand collect the data from the 10–Ks.  
DIVt  Common cash dividend per share for year t (COMPUSTAT dvc / csho).  
INVt  Capital investment per share for year t, measured as (-1)×(COMPUSTAT ivncf / csho) 
where ivncf is cash flows from investing activities. 
FFOt  Funds from operations per share, measured as I/B/E/S actual diluted FFO per share, 
adjusted to a basic FFO per share measure as follows: I/B/E/S diluted FFO per share times 
the number of shares used to compute diluted EPS (cshfd) less the amount of dilution, and 
then divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the end of year t. The amount 
of dilution is measured as diluted EPS (epsfx) times the number of shares used to compute 
diluted EPS (cshfd) less basic EPS (epspx) times the number of shares used to compute 
basic EPS (cshpri).  
BVt,ffo  Gross book value of common equity per share at the end of year t (BVt + accumulated 
depreciation per share at the end of year t). 
PEt-1,ffo  Gross book value of real property per share at the end of year t–1 (PEt-1 + accumulated 
depreciation per share at the end of year t-1 
FFOCOMP, t  FFO per share computed using COMPSTAT numbers. For REITs, NIt - DEPRt, and for 
non-REIT firms, NIt - DEPRt + Per-share gain and loss on the sale of property (-
1*COMPUSTAT SPPIV/csho).  
CFOt  Cash flows from operating activities per share for year t, which are measured as CFO 
(COMPUSTAT oancf) less preferred dividend (dvp) and then deflated by the number of 
shares outstanding at the end of year t (csho).  
FFO - CFOt   Non-CFO component of FFO measured as FFOCOMP minus CFO. 
DEPRt  Depreciation expense per share. For REITs,  -1*COMPUSTAT dpc/csho where dpc is 
depreciation expense in the statement of cash flows. If dpc is missing, depreciation expense 
for real estate (COMPUSTAT dpret) is used. For non-REIT firms, -1*COMPUSTAT 
dpc/csho. 
WCt-1  The book value of working capital per share at the end of year t–1. For REITs, we define 
working capital as net operating assets other than real property and measure its book value 
as debt plus equity less cash and real property, operationalized as: total assets 
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(COMPUSTAT at) – total liabilities (COMPUSTAT tl) + total debt (COMPUSTAT dltt 
and dlc) – cash and cash equivalents (COMPUSTAT che) – real property (COMPUSTAT 
ret). If any value is missing in COMPUSTAT, it is hand collect from the company's 10-K. 
Similarly, for non-REIT firms, we define working capital as net operating assets other than 
property, plant, and equipment and measure its book value as COMPUSTAT at – tl + dltt + 
dlc – che – ppent. 
LAND t-1  The book value of land per share at the end of year t-1   
BUILD t-1  The book value of buildings per share at the end of year t-1 (pet-1 – landt-1)  
CYCLE t  A composite index for real estate cycle phase for year t (See Appendix D for estimation)  
FIXEDt 
 
 
 Fixed asset ratio at the beginning of year t. This ratio is measured as the end-of-year net 
property, plant, and equipment deflated by the end-of-year total assets net of cash and 
short-term investment for non-REIT firms and as the end-of-year net real property deflated 
by the end-of-year total assets net of cash and short-term investment for REITs. 
   
Other variables in Tables 3, 8, and 9 
YIELDTB10Y, t  Yield to maturity on the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond at the end of year t less its mean for 
the period 1995–2008. 
REGt  An indicator variable for the post-NAREIT (1999) period, which is equal to one for the 
period 2000–2008 during which the NAREIT (1999) regulation is in effects, and is equal to 
zero for the period 1995–1999.  
GDPt  The cyclical component of the natural logarithm of GDP during year t 
TERMt 
 Term premium at the end of year t. The difference is yield to maturity on a government 
bond with 10 years to maturity and yield to maturity with 1 year to maturity  
DEFAULTt 
 Default-risk spread at the end of year t. The difference is yield to maturity on an Aaa 
corporate bond and yield to maturity on a Baa corporate bond. 
Note: If a single measurement for a variable is provided, the variable measurement is the same for REITS 
and non-REITs. 
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 Appendix D Measurement of the real estate cycle proxy 
 
Appendix D describes the measurement of a proxy for the real estate cycle phase during a fiscal year. 
Because there are no definitive or uncontroversial proxies, this study forms a composite index that reflects 
common variation in three real estate market variables that capture the market demand for and supply of 
real estate. These variables include (1) the quarterly National Council of Real Estate Investment 
Fiduciaries (NCREIF) total return (hereafter, the NCREIF total return), (2) the difference between the 
quarterly demand and supply indices for the U.S. private commercial real estate market (hereafter, the 
excess demand), and (3) the monthly housing starts index (hereafter, housing starts). I will introduce each 
of these real estate market variables and discuss how they are formed into a composite index.  
The NCREIF total return represents the market-level economic income on investment in commercial real 
property (NCREIF 2005). The NCREIF total return is computed by aggregating the net operating income 
and change in the market value of all commercial real property for a quarter. The value of a property is 
regarded as having changed during a quarter if an independent third party appraiser externally appraises 
the property, or if property managers observe changes in market conditions such as occupancy rates, 
rental rates, or interest rates. Property value can be adjusted for capital expenditures made during the 
quarter. The quarterly index data are available from 1978 to 2009.  
Excess demand is measured as the difference between the demand and supply indices for commercial real 
estate provided by the Commercial Real Estate Data Laboratory at the MIT Center for Real Estate 
(MIT/CRE). The MIT/CRE measures the demand and supply indices by estimating the reservation prices 
of suppliers and demanders (unobservable latent variables) using observed trading prices and volumes, 
and the attributes of traded property. Excess demand represents market liquidity that is presumably 
positively correlated with real estate cycles (Fisher et al. 2003). These indices are available from 1984 to 
2009.  
Housing starts are expected to be correlated with the performance of REITs that specialize in the 
residential property sector. According to Mayer and Somerville (2000), housing starts are a function of 
changes in housing prices and construction costs, and changes in housing prices convey information on 
the unanticipated growth in demand for houses. The data are available from 1978 to 2009.  
Each real estate market variable is likely to contain a common business-cycle component and an 
idiosyncratic component. To capture the common business-cycle information embedded in these 
variables, this study forms a composite index of these real estate market variables. The first step is to 
isolate the cyclical components of the three real estate market variables by using a filtering technique 
developed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter (hereafter, the HP 
filter) is used to decompose a real estate market variable into the equilibrium component and the cyclical 
component. Specifically, the HP filter is used to find a solution to the following optimization problem: 

2 2
1 1 2
1 1
{ } 1
Min {( ) ( )}
T T
t t t t t
t tTgt t
c g g g gλ − − −
= =
=
 + − − −∑ ∑  
           (HP) 
Subject to t t ty g c= +   for  t = 1, 2, 3, ... , T  
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where yt is the natural logarithm of one of the three variables, representing the total growth of the 
variable;32 gt is the equilibrium level of yt; and ct is the cyclical component of yt, oscillating around a 
mean of zero. The HP filter relies on the notion that the long-term equilibrium growth rate of an aggregate 
economic variable (i.e., gt – gt-1) must be smooth. A sufficiently large number for λ is used to penalize the 
variability of the long-term equilibrium growth rate of the variable. Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), λ = 
129,600 is used for monthly data. Quarterly real estate market variables are assumed to have the same 
value for all three months within a quarter. 
Next, this study computes the 12-month moving average of the cyclical components so that these 
variables may reflect cumulative changes in market demand during the last 12 months. The moving 
average data are not only compatible with contemporaneous annual financial data in the regressions but 
also reduce the effect of idiosyncratic variation in the individual real estate market variables.  
Finally, this study forms a composite index of these cyclical components and matches it to annual 
financial data. Principal components analysis leads to the following composite index 
    t 1t 2t 3tCYCLE 0.381c 0.351c 0.363c= + +         (CYCLE) 
where c1t, c2t, and c3t are the 12-month moving average of the cyclical components of the NCREIF total 
return index, the excess demand index, and the housing starts index, respectively.  
To check the robustness of results to the HP filtering, this study uses principal component analysis to 
measure a composite index of the three real estate market variables (not their cyclical components) 
               a, t t t tCYCLE 0.385NCREIF 0.344EXC 0.366HSTARTS= + +      (CYCLE-a) 
where NCREIFt, EXCt, and HSTARTSt are the 12-month moving averages of the NCREIF total return 
index, the excess demand index, and the housing starts index, respectively. This alternative proxy, 
CYCLEa,t, reflects the common variations of these three real estate market variables. 
The calendar year 2009 is used to compute the composite index because the composite index is based on 
the moving average data for the last 12 months and matched to a fiscal year. The fiscal year-end month 
for fiscal year 2008 is from June 2008 to May 2009. Untabulated monthly time series of the composite 
index shows that calendar year 2009 consists of a down period and a subsequent up period. Similarly, the 
calendar year 2009 data are used to identify the real estate cycle phase that includes fiscal year 2008. 
 
  
  
                                                 32 This study takes a log of housing starts to eliminate the growth trend of the variable. In contrast, this study does not take a log of the NCREIF total return on the excess market demand, because these variables do not include a growth trend. 
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Table 1  Sample selection process  
                                                                                                                                                  Firm-years 
Panel A. Sample for Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8                                
a) All REITs on COMPUSTAT 2010 (SIC = 6798, 6799) for the period 1994–2008 3,376 
b) Merge with firm-years having non-missing actual FFO from I/B/E/S summary file (2010). (1,656) 
  1,720 
c) Merge with firm-years having non-missing stock prices from CRSP monthly file (2010). (154) 
  1,566 
d) Delete observations that have missing values for cash flows from operating activities net 
of preferred dividend, income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation net 
of preferred dividend, depreciation expense, gains and losses on the sale of property, 
capital investment, book value of common equity, common cash dividend (per-share 
data). 
(52) 
  1,514 
e) Delete observations for hybrid REITs and mortgage REITs1) (99) 
  1,415 
f) Delete observations that have depreciation expense of zero. (3) 
  1,412 
g) Delete observations that have missing values for lagged accumulated depreciation, lagged 
book value of building, lagged book value of land, and lagged book value of working 
capital (per-share data).   
(296) 
  1,116 
h) Delete observations with values exceeding ± 3 standard deviations from the mean of each 
variable of stock prices, FFO, income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operation, capital investment, book value of common equity, book value of common 
equity plus accumulated depreciation, lagged book value of building, lagged book value of 
building plus accumulated depreciation, and common cash dividend (per-share data). 
(52) 
 (Number of equity REITs of the final sample = 157) 1,064 
Notes:  
1) List of mortgage and hybrid REITs for the period 1999–2008 obtained at the NAREIT’s website. 
FTSE provides U.S. Real Estate Index series that cover Equity, Mortgage, and Hybrid REITs. We 
delete all firm-years of all REITs that are included in the list. 
  
2) Tables 6 and 7 use a matching sample of non-REIT firms. Each REIT firm-year observation is 
matched to a non-REIT firm-year observation that has the same fiscal year and a fixed asset ratio 
closest to that of the REIT observation and is from an industry with mean industry fixed asset ratio of 
0.5 or greater. The fixed asset ratio is measured as the book value of property, plant, and equipment 
deflated by the difference between total assets and cash and short-term investment. Industry 
classification is based on the Fama and French (1997) industry classification. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics of a trimmed sample 
Panel A: Variables used in Tables 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 (N = 1,064) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
REIT observations  
Tables 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 
Pt 27.22 16.73 0.71 15.25 24.69 35.05 130.41 
NIt 0.94 0.90 -3.03 0.39 0.95 1.52 4.56 
FFOt 2.27 1.04 -1.15 1.44 2.19 2.89 6.11 
DIVt 1.63 0.68 0.00 1.12 1.65 2.06 4.06 
BVt 14.88 6.81 -3.76 9.33 15.03 19.53 36.62 
PEt-1 38.38 18.18 0.71 25.18 35.42 47.97 108.22 
FFOBVt  21.19 8.21 3.07 14.83 20.07 26.53 52.55 
FFO
1PEt−  44.11 20.83 1.32 28.70 41.14 54.86 123.94 
FFOCOMP 2.43 1.17 0.32 1.55 2.31 3.17 6.79 
CFOt 2.46 1.23 -1.31 1.58 2.29 3.17 7.96 
FFO-CFOt -0.19 0.75 -3.40 -0.46 -0.12 0.16 3.20 
FFOCOMP-CFOt -0.04 0.68 -3.36 -0.32 -0.03 0.22 4.10 
DEPRt -1.49 0.83 -6.17 -1.88 -1.33 -0.87 -0.13 
INVt  4.37 4.97 -8.70 1.19 3.11 6.51 28.80 
WCt-1 0.74 4.39 -21.23 -0.89 0.36 2.18 47.70 
LANDt-1 7.22 4.13 0.13 4.10 6.65 9.55 29.90 
BUILDc-1 31.16 15.47 0.59 20.00 28.91 38.49 88.87 
CYCLEt 0.15 1.06 -1.90 -0.68 0.07 1.54 2.04 
YTMTB10Y -0.36 0.95 -2.57 -0.82 -0.44 0.20 1.32 
FIXEDt 0.90 0.08 0.14 0.88 0.93 0.96 1.06 
Non-REIT observations  
Tables  6, 8 and 9 (Selected from extractive, utilities, transportation, entertainment, restaurant, and hotel 
industries) 
Pt 15.56 13.59 0.15 6.17 11.67 21.79 113.43 
CFOt 1.77 1.46 -1.75 0.72 1.56 2.55 10.58 
FFOCOMP-CFOt -0.30 0.68 -6.33 -0.46 -0.21 -0.07 4.51 
DEPRt -0.97 0.73 -5.93 -1.19 -0.84 -0.45 -0.05 
BVt 7.47 5.10 -13.52 3.80 7.29 10.55 31.09 
DIVt 0.15 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.25 
INVt  2.26 2.52 -9.97 0.68 1.59 3.04 14.72 
WCt-1 -4.81 6.65 -35.20 -6.83 -3.05 -0.51 11.03 
FIXEDt 13.82 0.90 0.08 0.15 0.87 0.93 0.96 
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Panel C. The industry composition of the non-REIT sample  
Fama-French 48 industries Three-digit SIC code N 
Tables  6, 8 and 9    
  Coal 120 - 129 2 
  Petroleum and Natural Gas 130 - 138, 290 - 291, 299 420 
  Entertainment 780 - 799 91 
  Precious metals 104 48 
  Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 589, 700 - 701, 704, 721 215 
  Mines 100 - 103, 105- 111, 140 - 149 6 
  Transportation 400 - 478 167 
  Utilities 490 - 494 115 
  Total   1,064 
 
Note:  
P25 and P75 indicate the 25th and the 75th percentiles of each variable. ***, **, and * respectively indicate 
two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. For variable definitions see Appendix C.  
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Table 3 Spearman rank correlations 
 
Panel A: Stock prices, accounting variables, and a real estate cycle proxy (1995–2008) 
 NIt FFOt DIVt BVt PEt-1 BVffo, t PEffo, t-1 CFOt 
FFOCOMP -
CFOt 
DEPRt INVt WCt-1 LANDt-1 BUILDt-1 CYCLE 
Pt 0.46 0.67 0.59 0.51 0.44 0.63 0.46 0.56 0.04 -0.37 0.20 0.15 0.47 0.39 0.30 
NIt  0.61 0.51 0.48 0.13 0.36 0.09 0.52 0.27 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.09 -0.03 
FFOt   0.77 0.63 0.65 0.76 0.64 0.79 0.05 -0.55 0.11 0.18 0.55 0.61 -0.08 
DIVt    0.61 0.57 0.72 0.57 0.68 0.06 -0.50 0.05 0.10 0.48 0.54 -0.05 
BVt     0.50 0.85 0.44 0.51 0.10 -0.32 0.26 0.08 0.41 0.48 -0.02 
PEt-1      0.74 0.99 0.66 -0.03 -0.82 0.01 -0.05 0.72 0.98 -0.09 
BVffo, t       0.75 0.71 0.02 -0.68 0.15 0.04 0.60 0.71 -0.04 
PEffo, t-1        0.67 -0.05 -0.85 -0.01 -0.05 0.72 0.97 -0.09 
CFOt         -0.36 -0.62 0.14 0.10 0.54 0.63 -0.10 
FFOCOMP -
CFOt 
         0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 
DEPRt           0.02 0.01 -0.52 -0.82 0.03 
INVt            0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.20 
WCt-1             0.04 -0.07 0.03 
LANDt-1              0.58 -0.06 
BUILDt-1               -0.09 
 
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables and a real estate cycle proxy (1995–2008)  
 CYCLE GDP TERM DEFAULT 
GDP 0.41***    
TERM -0.56*** -0.72***   
DEFAULT -0.44*** -0.27*** 0.42***  
YIELDTB10Y 0.02*** 0.18*** -0.32*** -0.61*** 
Note: ***, **, and * respectively denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. For variable definitions see Appendix C. 
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 Table 4 Estimation of the Feltham and Ohlson (1996) model 
 
The NI model:      0 1 2 3 4 t-1 5 tP NI DIV BV PE INV εα α α α α α= + + + + + +t t t t t  
The FFO model:   FFO FFO0 1 2 3 t 4 t-1 5 tP FFO DIV BV PE INV εα α α α α α= + + + + + +t t t t  
 
(a)  
Full period 
(b)  
The pre-NAREIT period 
(c)  
The post-NAREIT period  
1995–2008  1995–1999 00–08  
The NI model     
Intercept -0.97 2.65** -0.95  
NIt 3.97*** 4.66*** 4.69***  
DIVt 7.74*** 4.46*** 7.60***  
BVt  0.22** 0.36*** 0.25*  
PEt-1 0.17*** -0.05 0.17***  
INVt 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.87***  
Adj-R2 0.440 0.459 0.492  
The FFO model     
Intercept -3.16*** 0.90 -2.88**  
FFOt 6.59*** 2.50** 6.87***  
DIVt 2.88*** 4.10** 3.43***  
BVt,ffo  0.54*** 0.51*** 0.53***  
PEt-1,ffo -0.05 -0.10* -0.08*  
INVt 0.38*** 0.44*** 0.71***  
Adj-R2 0.500 0.427 0.538  
N 1,064  263  801  
The Vuong (1989) tests for  
H1: The above equations have equal explanatory power. 
Z-value1) -4.49*** 1.45 -3.04***  
Note:  
The pre-NAREIT (post-NAREIT) period indicates the period before (after) the NAREIT established the 
new definition of FFO in 1999. The coefficients of all regressions in this table estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). The standard error of the coefficient of each variable is adjusted for the 
correlations of error terms within firm clusters and year clusters (Peterson 2008). ***, **, and * 
respectively denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The statistical significance 
for each variable is based on a two-tailed p-value based on t-statistics for the coefficient of each 
explanatory variable. If a Z-value of the Vuong (1989) test is significantly different from zero, the 
results reject H1.  If a Z-value of the Vuong (1989) test is significantly positive, the net income model 
outperforms the FFO model. For variable definitions see Appendix C.  
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Table 5 Estimation of the modified Feltham and Ohlson (1996) model for REITs (Variations in the Base-case model)  
0 1 7 , 2 8 3 9 4 10 t 5 11 6( CYCLE )FFO ( CYCLE )DEPR ( CYCLE )BV ( CYCLE )DIV ( CYCLE )INV CYCLEt t COMP t t t t t t t t t tP δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ ε= + + + + + + + + + + + +
 
 Base case model Adding working capital Adding land 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Intercept -1.62 0.26 -1.84 0.01 -3.05*** -0.92 
FFOCOMPt 5.19*** 5.15***     
CFOt   5.78*** 5.57*** 8.06*** 4.88*** 
FFO-CFOt   3.25*** 2.86*** 7.01*** 2.67*** 
DEPRt 0.64 1.29** 0.97 1.57*** 1.61*** 2.51*** 
BVt 0.32** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.15* 0.25*** 
DIVt 6.68*** 6.50*** 6.08*** 6.03*** 3.47*** 5.78*** 
WCt-1   0.20* 0.24** 0.09 0.24** 
LANDt-1     0.65*** 0.73*** 
INVt 0.19** 0.24*** 0.13 0.16** 0.19** 0.21*** 
CYCLEt 4.97*** -1.19 5.18*** -1.21 5.39*** -1.619** 
FFOt ×CYCLEt  1.30**     
CFOt ×CYCLEt    1.11**  0.49 
(FFO-CFOt) ×CYCLEt    0.23  -0.12 
DEPRt ×CYCLEt  -1.43***  -1.54***  -1.19** 
BVt ×CYCLEt  0.09  0.13  0.09 
DIVt ×CYCLEt  -0.11  -0.19  0.10 
WCt-1 ×CYCLEt    0.24**  0.23** 
LANDt-1× CYCLEt      0.29*** 
INVt ×CYCLEt  -0.13  -0.15*  -0.10 
Adjusted R2 0.543 0.578 0.554 0.594 0.612 0.621 
Tests for depreciation bias       
FFOCOMPt - DEPRt 4.54*** 3.86***     
FFOCOMPt ×CYCLEt - DEPRt ×CYCLEt  2.73***     
CFOt - DEPRt   4.81*** 4.00*** 6.45*** 2.38*** 
CFOt ×CYCLEt - DEPRt ×CYCLEt    2.65***  1.68*** 
Note: All columns in each Panel use 1,064 observations. ***, **, and * respectively denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
All coefficients are estimated using OLS. The standard errors of coefficients are adjusted for firm- and year- clustering effects (Peterson 2008). 
Testing depreciation bias use the Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.     
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Table 6. Estimation of the modified Feltham and Ohlson (1996) model for REITs versus Non-REIT firms  
Model(column d): 
 0 1 9 2 10 3 11 4 12
5 13 t 6 14 1 7 15 8
( CYCLE ) FO ( CYCLE )(FFO - CFO ) ( CYCLE )DEPR ( CYCLE )BV
( CYCLE )DIV ( CYCLE )WC ( CYCLE )INV CYCLE
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
P Cδ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ ε−
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
 
Panel A: REITs versus Non-REIT (Non-REIT firms extracted from extractive, utilities, transportation, entertainment, restaurant, and hotel industries)  
  REITs Non-REITs 
Coefficient difference  
(REIT – Non-REIT) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Intercept -1.84 0.01 4.74*** 4.91*** -6.58*** -4.90*** 
CFOt 5.78*** 5.57*** 4.54*** 4.49*** 1.24* 1.08 
FFO-CFOt 3.25*** 2.86*** 1.99*** 1.88*** 1.26 0.98 
DEPRt 0.97 1.57*** 3.20*** 3.14*** -2.23** -1.56* 
BVt 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.55*** 0.55*** -0.21* -0.21* 
DIVt 6.08*** 6.03*** 2.03*** 2.08*** 4.05*** 3.94*** 
WCt-1 0.20* 0.24** 0.10* 0.09 0.103 0.15 
INVt 0.13 0.16** 0.30** 0.28** -0.164 -0.12 
CYCLEt 5.18*** -1.21 2.38*** 1.01** 2.79*** -2.22** 
CFOt ×CYCLEt  1.11**  0.35  0.76 
(FFO-CFOt) ×CYCLEt  0.23  -0.39  0.62 
DEPRt ×CYCLEt  -1.54***  0.77  -2.30*** 
BVt ×CYCLEt  0.13  0.07  0.06 
DIVt ×CYCLEt  -0.19  0.33  -0.51 
WCt-1 ×CYCLEt  0.24**  -0.08  0.32*** 
INVt ×CYCLEt  -0.15*  0.05  -0.20 
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.594 0.594 0.620   
Tests for depreciation bias       
CFOt - DEPRt 4.81*** 4.00*** 1.34*** 1.35*** 3.46*** 2.65*** 
CFOt ×CYCLEt - DEPRt ×CYCLEt  2.65***  -0.41  3.06*** 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel B: REITs versus Non-REIT firms (Non-REIT firms selected from two groups of industries) 
Model: Same as in Panel A 
  
REITs 
Non-REITs selected from 
entertainment, restaurants, and 
hotel industries 
Non-REITs selected from 
extractive industries 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Intercept -1.84 0.01 4.70*** 4.89*** 3.64*** 3.94*** 
CFOt 5.78*** 5.57*** 6.85*** 7.45*** 4.20*** 4.07*** 
FFO-CFOt 3.25*** 2.86*** 2.06*** 2.11*** 1.71*** 1.98*** 
DEPRt 0.97 1.57*** 4.72*** 5.97*** 4.19*** 4.03*** 
BVt 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.16* 0.30*** 1.13*** 1.11*** 
DIVt 6.08*** 6.03*** 3.35*** 1.81*** 1.63 1.73 
WCt-1 0.20* 0.24** 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
INVt 0.13 0.16** 0.49*** 0.22 -0.08 -0.05 
CYCLEt 5.18*** -1.21 1.92*** 1.96*** 3.29*** 2.19*** 
CFOt ×CYCLEt  1.11**  0.93*  0.36 
(FFO-CFOt) ×CYCLEt  0.23  1.25*  0.39 
DEPRt ×CYCLEt  -1.54***  1.90  0.61 
BVt ×CYCLEt  0.13  -0.12  0.15 
DIVt ×CYCLEt  -0.19  -2.34**  0.16 
WCt-1 ×CYCLEt  0.24**  -0.08  -0.13 
INVt ×CYCLEt  -0.15*  0.88***  -0.04 
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.594 0.516 0.547 0.652 0.705 
Tests for depreciation bias       
CFOt - DEPRt 4.81*** 4.00*** 2.13*** 1.48* 0.49 0.04 
CFOt ×CYCLEt - DEPRt ×CYCLEt  2.65***  -0.97  -0.25 
Note: Each column uses 1,064 observations. Each REIT firm-year observation is matched to a non-REIT firm-year observation with the closest 
fixed asset ratio and its industry average fixed asset ratio is greater than 50%. All coefficients are estimated using OLS. The standard errors of 
estimated coefficients are adjusted for firm- and year- clustering effects (Peterson 2008). ***, **, and * respectively denote two-tailed significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  Testing depreciation bias use the Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.
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Table 7 Confounding effects of NAREIT (1999) regulations on valuation weights 
Dependent variable = Pt REITs Non-REITs  
Coefficient difference  
(REIT – Non-REIT) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Intercept 4.70*** 6.32*** 2.21* 2.69** 2.49 3.63* 
CFOt 3.95*** 3.35*** 5.43*** 5.15*** -1.49 -1.60 
FFO-CFOt 2.21
* 2.41** 4.11** 3.81** -1.90 -1.40 
DEPRt 7.53
*** 7.74*** 4.29** 3.63* 3.24 4.11* 
BVt 0.38
*** 0.34*** 0.55*** 0.54*** -0.17 -0.20 
DIVt 6.05*** 6.01*** 6.74*** 7.45*** -0.69 -1.44 
WCt-1 0.31
** 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.06 
INVt 0.47
*** 0.54*** 0.59*** 0.34 -0.12 0.20 
CYCLEt -5.84
*** -11.25*** 1.85 0.70 -7.70*** -11.95*** 
CFOt × CYCLEt  1.51***  0.88  0.63 
(FFO - CFOt) × CYCLEt  0.08  1.32*  -1.24 
DEPRt × CYCLEt  -1.09**  1.85  -2.95** 
BVt × CYCLEt  0.13
*  -0.06  0.19 
DIVt × CYCLEt  -0.02  -2.66
**  2.63* 
WCt-1 × CYCLEt  0.19
*  -0.10  0.29** 
INVt × CYCLEt  -0.21
**  0.81***  -1.02*** 
REGt -6.23*** -5.92*** 4.25*** 3.39** -10.48*** -9.31*** 
CFOt × REGt  2.84** 3.01** 2.21 2.77** 0.63 0.24 
(FFO-CFOt) × REGt  1.22 0.58 -2.40 -1.74 3.63 2.32 
DEPRt × REGt  -5.31*** -4.91*** 3.12 3.66 -8.43*** -8.57*** 
BVt × REGt  -0.03 0.01 -0.37* -0.32 0.34 0.33 
DIVt × REGt  0.08 0.02 -6.15*** -7.03*** 6.24*** 7.04*** 
WCt-1 × REGt  -0.21 -0.10 -0.34** -0.38*** 0.13 0.29 
INVt × REGt  -0.06 -0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.12 -0.13 
CYCLEt × REGt  11.34*** 10.16*** 1.10 1.23 10.24*** 8.93*** 
Adjusted R2 0.623 0.667 0.541 0.573    
Tests for depreciation bias         
CFOt – DEPRt -3.58*** -4.19*** 1.14 1.52 -4.73*** -5.71*** 
CFOt*CYCLEt – DEPRt*CYCLEt  2.60***  -0.97  3.57*** 
CFOt*REGt – DEPRt*REGt 8.15*** 7.92*** -0.91 -0.89 9.06*** 8.81*** 
 
Note: All columns use 1,064 observations. Non-REIT firms are selected from extractive, utilities, 
transportation, entertainment, restaurant, and hotel industries. REGt is an indicator variable for the period 
following the NAREIT’s (1999) guidance on the definition of FFO. The other variables are as previously 
defined. All columns in each Panel use 1,064 observations.  All coefficients are estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) with firm-year clustering effects corrected (Peterson 2008).  ***, **, and * 
respectively denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The tests for the equations of 
coefficients are based on the Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. 
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Table 8 Confounding effects of discount rates on valuation weights 
Dependent variable = Pt REITs Non-REITs  
Coefficient difference  
(REIT – Non-REIT) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Intercept -2.49** 0.82 4.22*** 4.64*** -6.71*** -3.83*** 
CFOt 4.58*** 4.59*** 6.89*** 6.69*** -2.30*** -2.10*** 
FFO - CFOt 3.01*** 2.81*** 2.85*** 2.68*** 0.17 0.13 
DEPRt 0.46 2.14*** 6.11*** 5.77*** -5.65*** -3.63*** 
BVt 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.41
*** 0.43*** -0.07 -0.11 
DIVt 7.18*** 6.89*** 2.16*** 2.62*** 5.02*** 4.28*** 
WCt-1 0.35*** 0.31*** -0.08 -0.08 0.44
*** 0.39*** 
INVt 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.59
*** 0.17 -0.32 0.15 
CYCLEt 4.12*** -2.68*** 2.20
*** 1.74** 1.92*** -4.42*** 
CFOt × CYCLEt  1.89***  1.33**  0.56 
(FFO - CFOt) × CYCLEt  0.68  0.75  -0.06 
DEPRt × CYCLEt  -1.24**  2.40*  -3.64** 
BVt × CYCLEt  0.12  -0.12  0.24
* 
DIVt × CYCLEt  -0.60  -2.59
**  1.99 
WCt-1 × CYCLEt  0.17  -0.09  0.26
* 
INVt × CYCLEt  -0.24***  0.91
***  -1.14*** 
YTMTB10Y, t  -3.07*** -0.98 -2.93*** -1.49*** -0.14 0.51 
CFOt × YTMTB10Y, t  -3.40*** -3.38*** -0.94** -1.76*** -2.45*** -1.62** 
(FFO - CFOt) × YTMTB10Y, t  -1.40*** -1.39** 1.51*** 0.84 -2.91*** -2.23** 
DEPRt × YTMTB10Y, t  -1.97*** -0.70 -1.92* -2.86*** -0.05 2.16* 
BVt × YTMTB10Y, t  0.05 0.02 0.22*** 0.14 -0.16 -0.12 
DIVt × YTMTB10Y, t  1.98** 1.83** 1.98*** 2.52*** 0.00 -0.69 
WCt-1 × YTMTB10Y, t  0.29*** 0.18** 0.06 0.11 0.22** 0.06 
INVt × YTMTB10Y, t  0.32*** 0.34** -0.03 -0.10 0.35* 0.45** 
CYCLEt × YTMTB10Y, t  -1.43*** -1.85*** -1.04** -0.14 -0.39 -1.71*** 
Adjusted R2 0.594 0.637 0.569 0.539   
 Tests for depreciation bias         
CFOt – DEPRt 4.13*** 2.45*** 0.78 0.91 -4.73*** -5.71*** 
CFOt*CYCLEt – DEPRt*CYCLEt  3.13***  -1.07  3.57*** 
 
Note: All columns use 1,064 observations. Non-REIT firms are selected from extractive, utilities, 
transportation, entertainment, restaurant, and hotel industries. YTMTB10Y, t is the difference between the 
yield-to-maturity for the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond and its average for the 1995–2008 period. The other 
variables are as previously defined. All columns in each Panel use 1,064 observations.  The coefficients 
of all regressions in this table are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with firm- and year-
clustering effects corrected (Peterson 2008).  ***, **, and * respectively denote two-tailed significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The tests for the equations of coefficients are based on the Huber-White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. 
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